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W. H. Werkmeister, Historical Spectrum of Value Theories, VoL 1: The German-Language Group, Johnsen Publishing Co., Lincoln, Nebraska, 1970. xxviii + 453 pp., $ 7.50 This is the first of a projected two-volume work on the history of value theory roughly from the nineteenth century to the present. The second volume will deal with Anglo-American theories. I must say immediately that this is an excellent historical introduction to value theory in general and to the German theorists in particular. It is well-organized, wellwritten and extremely thorough, given the scope of the enterprise and the relative brevity of the discussions. I strongly recommend its consideration for classroom use. There are whole chapters devoted to the views of Brentano, Meinong, yon Ehrenfels, Kreibig, Heyde, Rickert, M/insterberg, Scheler, Wiederhold, Stern, Wilken, Beck and Kraft, and three chapters dealing with less important views like those of Moriz Naumann, Otto Ritschl and Felix Krueger. What is especially distinctive about Werkmeister's history is his careful attention to arguments leading to and from the various views presented. For example, he tells us that Meinong saw that value had to be distinguished from use because (a) iron is more useful than gold but less valuable, (b) works of art may have esthetic value but no use, (c) love and friendship have value but may have no use and (d) usefulness presupposes value since something can be useful only as a means to a valuable end (pp. 73-75). Similarly, we are told that Heyde rejected Scheler's view that value is some sort of quality because (a) it is never discovered as a primary quality and (b) it is quite unlike secondary qualities insofar as (i) the latter are typically correlated with physical conditions but values may not be, (ii) some value objects are not physical at all and (iii) "'Secondary qualities' are all qualities of sense impressions; value experience, however, is essentially a concern of the emotions .... " (p. 162) Whether or not Theory and Decision 3 (1973) 388-389. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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one accepts any of these arguments, it is extremely useful to have them presented in such a straightforward way. And this is all to the credit of Werkmeister. One cart only look forward to the second volume with a feeling that it will be well worth waiting for.

Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario

ALEX C. MICHALOS

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Policy Sciences Book Series, A Cumulative Review. Policy Sciences Book Series is a new series edited by Yehezkel Dror and published by American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc. In its aims and interdisciplinary method the series is very much like that of this journal. Hence, readers of this journal will find a great deal of interest in this new series, not to mention the journal Policy Sciences put out by the same publisher. In the following paragraphs I shall briefly describe and comment upon the five volumes in the series that are presently available. All of them came out in 1971. A Pre-View of Policy Sciences (H. D. Lasswell, 173 pp., $ 7.50) consists of thought-provoking but somewhat disjointed reflections and hypotheses about the motives and behavior of individuals in large organizations. The characteristically Lasswellian theme of the need for 'shared power' in order to prevent the exploitation of the many by the few permeates much of the discussion. Beginning with a 'working definition' of policy sciences as sciences "concerned with knowledge of and in the decision processes of the public and civic order" (p. 1), we are guided through models of social and decision processes, an elucidation of the 'principal components' of the 'value goals of human dignity', techniques of mobilizing and synthesizing information on and attention to policy alternatives, relations between policy analysts and politicians, standards of appraisal for various facets of decision processes, and the professional identity and training of policy scientists. The main infelicity of this book is that too often suggestive diagrams, arrows, outlines and numbered topic-titles seem to substitute for careful analyses of logical and/or empirical connections. Design for Policy Sciences (Y. Dror, 156 pp., $ 7.50) is a theoretical apologia and practical manual for policy sciences, and in general it is successful on both counts. The inability of behavioral and management sciences as we now know them to satisfactorily link human concerns and technological expertise in the development of sound public policy is the primary compelling reason to develop what Dror calls, following Kuhn, a new 'scientific paradigm'. Since neither Kuhn nor anyone else has been able to clarify this notion of a paradigm with much success, it would probably be useful to avoid it. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that something new must be added in order to bring about the needed fusion and the program of study proposed by Dror may be just what is required. Theory and Decision 3 (1973) 390-393. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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In this book he describes the basic characteristics and barriers to the development of policy sciences; nascent programs; metapolicy and megapolicy; research, teaching and the professionalization of policy sciences; and the implications of policy sciences for politics and science. Ventures in Policy Sciences (Y. Dror, 321 pp., $12.50) is essentially a collection of more or less independent essays demonstrating the kind of contribution a policy scientist might make to the development of public policy. It contains three chapters on the application of social sciences to policy-making, three on law and social change, four on futuristics, four on planning, two on modernization and five on various facets of policy analysis. The result is a useful and interesting mix of theoretical and applied discussions. The only thing that troubled me as I read this volume was that it seemed that a fairly substantial and impeding vocabulary was emerging, e.g., mega-metapolicy, metacontrol, metaevaluation, min-avoidance, multiactor, novadesign, preferize and ultrastability. For the sake of interdisciplinary communication and the hope of making some impact on public officials (most of whom are not technocrats), it would seem to be wise to resist the temptation to coin a number of new words. At any rate, anyone interested in a good introduction to the new field of policy sciences and limited to the purchase of one of the five books reviewed here should definitely have this one. Social Policy Research and Analysis (W. Williams, 204 pp., $ 9.50) constitutes decisive empirical evidence for Lasswell and Dror's grim judgements about the present relevance of research in social sciences to the formulation of public policy. As a former Chief of the Office of Research, Plans, Programs, and Evaluation in the United States Office of Economic Opportunity during the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty, Williams had an excellent view of the problems involved in finding relevant social research. In brief, he tells us that "In the main the research studies performed by the social science research community have been irrelevant or mildly relevant.., to key decision issues in federal social policymaking for the disadvantaged. There is a severe shortage of the data, techniques, and researchers needed for performing policyrelevant studies .... The social science research community in general is not structured to respond to the analytical needs of social agencies; its reward structure militates against research directly in support of policy analysis." (p.15) Although it is a bit repetitious, this is a worthwhile

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firsthand report of the major problems involved in bringing social science into public administration. The disturbing feature of the volume is the apparent unfamiliarity with or, at any rate, inability to put into practice some of the well-known findings of management science about the initiation of change in organizations. For example, Williams informs us that "PPB as well as the War on Poverty stumbled on the twin obstacles of specification and implementation," (p. 11) but these are two 'obstacles' that management science trainees are warned against at the very beginning of their schooling. Hence, one begins to wonder about the relevance of such training or training in policy analysis generally to the "real world" of public administration. Organizational Growth Through Decisionmaking (B. K. Rome and S. C. Rome, 242 pp., $15.00) presents a developmental-task theory of organizations similar in intention to the sort described for individuals in the work of H. S. Sullivan and R. J. Havighurst. The authors cite basic 'milestones', each of which has several subdivisions. The eight fundamental divisions are "Incorporation, Active Management, Sensitization, Operational Control, Administrative Control, Formulation and Application of Administrative Principles, Establishment of Authority on Moral Basis and Innovative Planning." (p. 212) Unfortunately, I have doubts about the conceptual foundations of this study and about the methodology employed. Briefly, the method consisted of creating operating groups, assigning them tasks in the presence of certain restrictions and resources and repeatedly asking something like "What new feature of social action has emerged that bespeaks social development?" Because the nature of the restrictions and resources were periodically altered, one would expect different kinds of skills, commitments and plans to be generated by the group. That is precisely what happened. But it remains unclear which, if any, of the 'milestones' were a product of the introduced changes and which were part of some more or less natural phylogeny. Furthermore, the descriptions of the 'milestones' themselves suggest that there are serious conceptual dependencies that are unnoticed and that tend to play havoc with the logical neatness of the various subdivisions, i.e., they are certainly not mutually exclusive and probably not exhaustive. For example, "development 3" involves a "covenant... with a source of rightful social power" (p. 65) while "development 43" which is supposed to occur somewhat later consists

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of "acknowledging competing rights" (p. 197). The allegedly later development seems to be logically presupposed by the former.

Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario

ALEX C. MICHALOS

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H. J. Hummell und K.-D. Opp, Die Reduzierbarkeit yon Soziologie auf Psychologie- Eine These, ihr Test und ihre theoretische Bedeutung ('Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaft und Philosophie', Hrsg. S. Moser u. S. J. Schmidt, Bd. 7), Friedr. Vieweg & Sob_n, Braunschweig, 1971, 102 S., DM 19.80. Die Frage des Verh/iltnisses von Soziologie und Psychologie und insbesondere die der gegebenen oder nicht gegebenen Reduzierbarkeit von Soziologie auf Psychologie hat zwar seitens der Soziologen stets g/i,ngige Beantwortung gefunden - und zwar im Sinne strikter Ablehnung der Reduzierbarkeit - ist von ihnen jedoch kaum je in ihren sachliehen Aspekten ernsthaft untersucht worden. In erstaunlichem MaBe haben sich bier ungeprfifte Formeln erhalten - wie etwa die yon der 'objektbedingten Eigenst~indigkeit der Soziologie' - die ihre Z~.hlebigkeit nicht zuletzt der traditionellen Tendenz verdanken, das Problem des Verh~tltnisses von Soziologie und Psychologie zu ontologisieren. Einer sachlichen Behandlung des Problems war auch keineswegs zutr~tglich, dab es eine Zeit lang beliebt war - hier sei nur beispielhaft der Name Othmar Spanns genannt - den naheliegenden Schritt yon der ontologisierten zur politisierten Fragestellung nach dem Primat yon 'Individuum' oder 'Gesellschaft' zu tun. Die insbesondere in den Fiinfziger Jahren gefiihrte wissenschaftstheoretische Diskussion um das Reduktionsproblem bzw. das Problem 'methodologischer Individualismus versus metholodogischer Kollektivismus' hat dann zu einigen Kl/irungen beigetragen, insbesondere zur Aufdeckung des mangelnden bzw. fehlenden Aussagegehaltes mancher 'Standardargumente' wie etwa der beliebten Formel vom Ganzen, das mehr sei als die Summe seiner Teile. Freilich land diese Diskussion nicht unter Soziologen, sondern unter wissenschaftstheoretisch interessierten Philosophen statt, und R. Ph. Dore konnte 1961 zu Recht bedauernd bemerken, die Kontroverse um das Prinzip des methodologischen Individualismus sei im Sande verlaufen, ohne bei den Soziologen nennenswerte Beachtung gefunden zu haben ('Function and Cause', ASR 26, 851). Auf dem bier angesprochenen Hintergrund ist es erfreulich, dab mit der Schrift yon H. J. Hummell und K.-D. Opp nunmehr ein Beitrag vorliegt, der sich eingehend mit dem Problem der Reduktion yon SozioTheory and Decision 3 (1973) 394-396. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Itolland

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logie auf Psychologie befal3t. Den Autoren geht es dabei nicht um eine Verfolgung der obengenannten wissenschaftstheoretischen Diskussion, sie setzen vielmehr dort an, wo diese ihr Ende fand. Dieses Ende ist durch die Einsicht gekennzeichnet, dab es bei der Frage des Verh/iltnisses yon Soziologie und Psychologie, und speziell der Reduzierbarkeit von Soziologie auf Psychologie, sinnvoUerweise nicht um das Verh/iltnis zweier 'Gegenstandsbereiche' oder auch zweier 'Disziplinen' zueinander gehen kann. Vielmehr kann bier nur das logische Verh/iltnis zweier Theorien, also zweier Aussagensysteme zueinander zur Debatte stehen. Das heil3t aber, dab hier eine Frage gegeben ist, die sich nicht mit ontologisch oder wie auch immer begrfindeten a priori Urteilen beantworten 1/il3t, sondern nur aufgrund einer Analyse des tats/ichlichen logischen Verh/iltnisses zwischen jeweils vorliegenden soziologischen und psychologischen Theorien. Eine solche Analyse wollen Hummell und Opp mit ihrer Arbeit vorlegen, und sie k/bnnen zu Recht behaupten, "die ReduktionismusThese (sei) in dieser Art bisher noch nicht fiberprfift worden" (S. 9). Nach einer einleitenden Explizierung der Reduktionismus-These und einem Kapitel zur Erlauterung der 'Logik der Reduktion' zeigen die Autoren, die-wenn sie 'Psychologie' sagen-insbesondere die (behavioristische) Lerntheorie und die Theorien der kognitiven Dissonanz und Konsonanz im Auge haben, an einer Reihe von Beispielen auf, dab soziologische Begriffe durch psychologische definierbar und soziologische Hypothesen aus psychologischen ableitbar sind, dal3 also i.d.S, eine Reduktion m/3glich ist. In einem abschliel3enden Kapitel gehen Hummell und Opp dann auf die positiven Effekte ein, die sie von einer konsequenten Verfolgung einer reduktionistischen Strategie fiir soziologische Theoriebildung und Forschung erwarten. Was die Analyse zur Prfifung der Reduktionismus-These anbelangt, so mag nicht jeder den speziellen Vorschl~igen der Autoren zur psychologischen Definition soziologischer Begriffe und zur psychologischen Erklarung soziologischer Hypothesen zustimmen wollen. Doch dfirfte jedem im Nachvollzug der Argumentation yon Hummell und Opp deutlich werden, dal3 ein ernsthafter Versuch zu einer - in der Regel notwendigen - Pr~tzisierung des Gehaltes soziologischer Begriffe und Hypothesen eine Tendenz zu einer mehr individualistischen und i.d.S. psychologischen Formulierung nach sich zieht. Bedenkt man, dab gerade die Absicht, eine Hypothese empirisch zu testen, einen Zwang zu ihrer

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prazisen Formulierung einschlieBt, so ist es dann auch nicht verwunderlie/a, wenn Hummell und Opp zu ihrer Suche nach empirisch getesteten Hypothesen fiber Kollektiva, also 'soziologischen' Hypothesen, bemerken: "Bei der Suche nach derartigen Hypothesen sind wir auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten gestof3en. Wir haben n/imlich festgestellt, dab Hypothesen, die man als 'soziologisch' bezeichnen wfirde, dann, wenn sic geprfift werden, als Aussagen fiber Individuen formuliert werden." (S. 51). Gerade ein solcher Befund macht deutlich, wie dringend notwendig es war, das Reduktionsproblem - so wie es bei Hummell und Opp geschieht - yon der Ebene prinzipieller Argumentation auf die Ebene konkreter materialer Theorie herabzuholen. Wenn durch eine solche Analyse am traditionellen Selbstverstandnis mancher Soziologen gerfittelt wird, so kann dies ffir die Entwicklung einer soziologischen Theorie, die nicht ein vorgefertigtes Selbstbild, sondern allein die Erkl~trung sozialer Ph/inomene zu ihrer Richtschnur hat, nur heilsam sein.

Department of Sociology, Technical University Berlin, Berlin.

VIKTOR VANBERG

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Joseph Margolis, Values and Conduct, Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1971. x+227 pp., $ 2.50 (paper). This book is to be recommended as a solid, readable, yet highly advanced discussion of subtle points in ethical theory. In the interests of brevity, I shall restrict my comments to those aspects of the present work which seem (to the present reviewer, at least) most interesting or challenging. Margolis begins by calling attention to the logical connection between the rejection of cognitivism in ethics at the beginning of this century, and the self-effacing, conscientious restriction to 'metaethical' investigations adopted by many of Moore's followers, or others impressed with Moore's arguments. Margolis points out that whenever cognitivism thrives, conversely, the distinction between ethics and metaethics (if one such can be upheld) becomes blurred, indeed collapses altogether (p. 15). Margolis himself pursues a 'metamoral' inquiry, especially in the later stages of the book, and at one point his tacit dismissal of eognitivism becomes explicit (p. 119). To the present reviewer, the most valuable technique to emanate from this careful work is Margolis' distinction between 'findings' and 'appreciative judgements.' (p. 21; later, p. 127). This is very much reminiscent of Dewey's famous prizing-appraising duality, which resurfaces in a number of more recent authors (John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 5; C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 398; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 492). I should say that Margolis' distinction cuts deeper - a contention which he supports through illustrations far better than what I could produce here - and has the additional advantage, that it readily disposes of emotivism (as well as Kantianism; see p. 36), or moral theories which 'threaten' the 'objectivity' or the 'meaningful' content of moral utterances or statements; likewise, it serves and is deliberately so intended, to undermine the ancient bromide that there is no disputing tastes and colors (p. 19). Lack of space prohibits a more detailed survey of the points brought out, sometimes with great eloquence, by the author. I did not notice any typographical errors in the text, but in the footnotes they are abundant. I list them as follows: p. 213n6, of (not 'on'); ditto p. 214n7 to Ch. 3; p. 216n4 to Ch. 6, pagination should be 23-33; p. 214n2 to Ch. 2, pp. 216-7n5, and p. 219n28, pagination in each case Theory and Decision 3 (1973) 397-398. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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should be 23-37; p. 218n14, date should be 1957; p. 220n6, pagination should be 320-344 for Strawson; pp. 218-219n4, page indication should be 346, more precisely. For the discussion on p. 164 (p. 220n35), it would be germane to refer additionally to Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, esp. pp. 428-9; finally, p. 217n6 to Ch. 6, pagination should be 464-477. In a number of cases, Margolis is tacitly keying his references to reprints, e.g. the anthology by Sellars and Hospers, rather than to original location in journals.

Dept. of Philosophy, Roosevelt University

DENNIS ROHATYN

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Miguel A. Quintanilla, Idealismo y filosoffa de la ciencia: Introduceidn a la epistemolog[a de Karl R. Popper, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1972. 164 pp. This is the first book by a promising professor of philosophy at the Universidad de Salamanca and a member of the youngest generation of Spanish intellectuals - the first after the Civil War to get in touch with universal culture. Unlike the Spanish philosophers trained shortly before or after the Civil War, but like several others of his own generation, Quintanilla's brain has not been ravaged by existentialism: he writes clearly on genuine problems. He has produced a relatively fair expos6 and unsympathetic criticism of Popper's philosophy of science ('epistemologia' in Spanish) from a realist and materialist viewpoint. Some of Quintanilla's criticisms are too harsh, particularly since he offers no better alternative to Popper's methodology. But several other criticisms are well taken and worth being considered by Popper's school. To begin with Quintanilla refuses to see any decisive differences between Popper and the Vienna Circle. From his European perspective, Popper's rebellion against positivism was a storm in a cup of tea. In fact he thinks that Popper's philosophy is 'formalist' and 'individualist' - j u s t as much as the Vienna Circle's. (By 'formalism' Quintanilla means unhistorical and removed from practice.) Secondly he accuses both Popper and the orthodox positivists of dogmatism, for their alleged unwillingness to examine their own philosophical presuppositions - e.g. their ideas on rationality and on the decisive role of experience in testing scientific theories. Thirdly, Quintanilla claims that Popper's methodology does not account for actual scientific research because it ignores the role played in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses and theories by statements that are not about experience - such as metaphysical principles. Fourthly, the author maintains that refutationism is inconsistent with any theory of truth, in particular Tarski's: that no sooner did Popper adopt Tarski's theory than he became a verificationist, in that he came to regard it as a success for a theory not merely to withstand attempts at refuting it, but also to be corroborated by positive evidence. Fifth and last, Quintanilla subjects Popper's recent views on the autonomy of the 'third world' of ideas to scathing criticism. He thinks that this piece of objective idealism is consistent with Popper's previous philosophy, which regards Theory and Decision 3 (1973) 399--400. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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scientific ideas as towering above experience and action as well as above philosophies and ideologies. This reviewer's main complaints are as follows. (1) Quintanilla underrates the value of logic and formal semantics and their power to shed light on scientific ideas in themselves, quite apart from the circumstances of their birth and death. (2) Popper's lack of concern for the social concontext of science does not render him an idealist: he is mainly interested in certain internal characteristics of scientific knowledge, which are quite independent of social structure and social change. An overemphasis on the social and psychological aspects of science may easily lead to a subjectivism of the Polanyi and Kuhn type. (3) 'Formalism' should not be a derogatory term, though 'empty (or pointless) formalism' should. If anything, Popper's philosophy could be criticized for not being 'formal' (exact and systematic) enough. (4) Like most philosophers of science, Quintanilla is less familiar with science than with other philosophers and on this point he is at a disadvantage with respect to Popper. (5) Quintanilla claims that dialectics can do for a philosophical understanding of science what 'formalism' fails to do - but he does not tell us what exactly the principles of dialectics are nor does he substantiate his claim with a detailed and first hand analysis of a piece of real science ill the light of those principles. Altogether a serious work, deeper and less ideological than the criticisms (or rather attacks) proffered by either the hermeneutic school or the Frankfurter Sehule. This reviewer looks forward to the reaction of the Popperians as well as to Quintanilla's promised investigations on the relevance of Jean Piaget's psychology of knowledge to epistemology.

Filosofisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus

MARIO BUNGE

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Hans Albert and Ernst Topitsch (eds.), Werturteilsstreit, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1971. xii + 552 pp., DM 53.80. The so called value problem is one of the most discussed methodological issues in the social sciences. Contributions to this discussion are published in a great number of diverse journals and books about sociology, economics, moral philosophy, etc. In this situation, the appearance of a reader on the value problem has great merit. The book consists of four parts. In part I - Values, Value Concepts and Value Sentences - we find a short introduction by the editors and contributions from Max Scheler, Ernst Topitsch, Theodor Geiger and Viktor Kraft. Part II - The Value Problem in the Sciences - includes contributions from Erich Kahler, Leo Strauss, Ernst Troeltsch, Gerhard Weisser, Ren6 K6nig, Wilhelm E. Miihlmann, Hans Albert, Ernest Nagel, Bruno Molitor and Thomas Dewar Weldon, deals most centrally with the subject of the book. In part I I I - Decision, Interest and Justification - the editors reprint writings of J. W. N. Watkins, Jiirgen Habermas, Paul F. Schmidt, Ernst Topitsch and Heinrich Gomperz. The contributions in part IV - Justification, Evaluation, Validity - by Herbert Feigl, Walter Dubislav, Hans Reichenbach, Hans Albert, Ija Pawowska and Hans Lenk are of special importance. From the names of these authors it can be seen that some contributions are rather old and that very different positions are put forward. The writings, however, are selected in such a way that some positions presented in some of the papers are criticized in other contributions .Thus, the excerpts from Max Scheler's book Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik represent intuitionism in ethics which is criticized in Hans Albert's Paper "Ethik und Metaethik". Thus, the reader is informed of the most important positions and in addition he is confronted with the unsolved problems. The writings selected are not only concerned with the value problem in the social sciences but also with contributions to ethics (Part IV) discussing value problems in general and not only in science exclusively. Usually social scientists do not know such writings. The book may thus contribute to a more informed discussion of the value problem in the social sciences. The book is highly recommended to all social scientists, even if in our Theory and Decision 3 (1973) 401-402. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht- Holland

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opinion some contributions should have been substituted by others. The book would have been more useful if the editors had compiled a bibliography with comments and a subject index.

Department of Sociology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg

KARL-DIETER OPP