Dialect Anthropol (2013) 37:165–169 DOI 10.1007/s10624-013-9298-x

The new constitution and the paradox of Kurdish problem Ayhan Bilgen

Published online: 13 March 2013 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

The promise of a new constitution has had a privileged place in the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) agenda since 2002. Turkey’s current constitution that was prepared by the military junta in 1982 has ruled the country under a militaristic straightjacket for the past three decades. When the AKP came to power, complaints about the 1982 Constitution had given way to mass demands in the country for constitutional reform under the facilitating influence of Turkey’s European Union Accession Process. Between 2002 and 2005, the AKP passed some reforms that the EU demanded in the fields of political liberalization and the enhancement of freedom of expression. Included in these were also certain legal arrangements to open some space for democratic deliberation of the Kurdish issue— such as the total lifting of the State of Emergency Rule (1987–2002) in Kurdish provinces, the abolition of semi-military State Security Courts, limited TV broadcast in Kurdish and Kurdish language courses in private institutions. Yet, this reform process did not lead to much practical change in the fields of governance or basic rights and freedoms. The limited improvements in freedom of expression were reversed with a new Anti-Terror Bill in 2006, which instituted the broadest definition of terror the country has yet seen. Also, Special Heavy Penal Courts were set up for ‘‘terror crimes’’ to replace the old State Security Courts. Thus, from early on the AKP’s reforms had a ‘‘one step ahead, two step backwards’’ character. Still, the AKP could promote itself as the only source of hope for comprehensive reform, leading the complaints about the slow pace of democratization and putting the blame for this on the army’s tutelage over civilian politics. The discourse of civilianization as a prerequisite for democratization increased the electoral support for the party in the elections of 2007 and 2011. After the 2007 Translated by: Dr. Hisyar Ozsoy ([email protected]). A. Bilgen (&) Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected]

123

166

A. Bilgen

elections, the AKP once more deferred the promise of making a new constitution with the excuse of clearing the ground off the army’s influence for a healthy conduct of the process. Many liberal and oppositional groups and some sectors of the Kurds welcomed this ‘‘civilianization first’’ discourse. In 2010, some constitutional amendments were made by a referendum, which ended Kemalist influence over the judiciary and opened the way for the trial of military officers in civilian courts. Over the last few years, the army’s tutelage over Turkish politics has been brought to a conclusive end. Left without an excuse for further deferral, the AKP government finally set up a parliamentary commission to draft a new constitution after the elections in June 2011. The Kurdish issue is perhaps the most central and contested issue in the current constitutional debates, because it poses a fundamental paradox. Commenting on the issue, Kemal Kılıc¸darog˘lu, the chair of Republican People Party (RPP), stated that his party would accept negotiations to settle the Kurdish conflict only if the PKK laid down arms first. He added, however, that his party would not have any compromise with regard to constitutional ‘‘red lines’’ for such negotiations. These red lines include the first three articles of the current constitution prepared by the military junta, which define the character of the Turkish state in strictly nationalist and unitary terms and specify the language of the state as Turkish. Given that decentralization in the form of democratic autonomy and mother tongue education are the two primary Kurdish demands, any settlement of the Kurdish issue would require a change in these articles. Moreover, these statements of the chair of RPP are not his personal ideas, but represent the conventional and memorized approach of the Turkish state to the Kurdish issue. They point to the vicious cycle in debates over democratization and the Kurdish issue, as it is very well known that the PKK would not lay down arms until Kurdish rights are secured through constitutional guarantees. Given this paradox, there seems to be no possibility on the horizon other than the continuation of political conflict. And although it should be serving as a historical opportunity for a solution, the current debates point to the fact that if the new constitution is ever made, it will most likely further deepen the problem. The AKP has been claiming that there will not be any compromise over democratization while ‘‘fighting against terror.’’ But we are once again witnessing that this claim is made up of sheer words. Kurdish politicians, journalists, lawyers, trade unionists or students are arbitrarily arrested as part of the ‘‘fight against terror.’’ Although most of these cases are still pending, these people have already been punished by long and unfair trial processes. These repressions would not decrease conflicts and deaths. They would not contribute to security and peace. Quite the contrary, they are fueling up political tensions and further spreading conflicts. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an frequently claims that the Kurdish problem was already resolved and the resolution of the issue of terror is impending. Besides, particularly after the 2011 elections, he resorted to the conventional state discourse by repeating again and again that there is no Kurdish problem as such in Turkey, but social and economic problems of his ‘‘citizens of Kurdish origin.’’ This denialist approach has increased the doubts about what the Prime Minister really expects from a new constitution. If his government has already resolved the Kurdish

123

The paradox of Kurdish problem

167

issue, which constitutes the most significant problem of Turkey’s democracy, then why is there a need to make a new constitution anyway? The need for a new constitution to end the policies of discrimination and denial pursued against diverse groups that make up Turkey’s populace has been debated over decades. The current constitution has significant handicaps regarding equal rights for different religious groups and the impartiality of the state toward different cultures, languages and identities. There is a need for a socially grounded foundational will to make a new constitution toward creating the necessary conditions for living together and in peace. A redefinition of the relationship between state and society through the principles of impartiality and pluralism may also ease overcoming the crisis of trust among different sectors of the society. It should also be noted that the existing social splits and potential for conflicts are fed up by fears and worries inherited from the past. The monist language deliberately used by the government and other system parties both excludes the Kurds and increases the potential of conflicts among different social groups who have already been deeply alienated from one another due to decades of low-intensity warfare in the Kurdish region. Its 10-year rule has shown how the AKP views the democratic principle of the separation of powers. The control of military bureaucracy by civilian political power is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation and maintenance of a democratic order. Unfortunately, the end to the army’s control over politics has not opened the way for the expansion and promotion of social rights and freedoms in Turkey. It has not facilitated the growth of civil society or increased the effective social opposition, either. The trials of high-level military bureaucrats on charges of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order had garnered support from all sectors of the society except for the hard-liner Kemalists, but the government chose to use these trials as a revanchist means of settling the scores with the army rather than for consolidating institutional democracy. Besides, the Prime Minister himself pointed to the ‘‘will of the executive’’ in the ongoing trials of thousands of Kurdish politicians and activists. Recently, in November 2012, he publicly stated that he had ‘‘talked to the judiciary’’ for the abdication of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) deputies’ parliamentary immunity—an interesting statement as the Prime Minister actually admitted to having committed a constitutional crime. Such an approach to the separation of powers continues to be an important threat to basic rights and freedoms. The last few years have witnessed an increasingly tighter grip of the government on the legislative process. The government has not improved the parliament’s representative capacity through the much-needed reforms such as the reduction of the 10 % election bar, the amendment of the Law on Political Parties and the revision of the Parliamentary Internal Statue. Added to these is the debate on the presidential system. A constitutional amendment passed in 2007 paved the way for the election of the President by popular vote (rather than by the Parliament). This has encouraged the government for a passage to a presidential or semi-presidential system. The debates over this issue are fueling up the worries that the already circumscribed Turkish parliament would further weaken.

123

168

A. Bilgen

Restrictions on freedom of expression and the government’s approach to the media are two other crucial problems in the country. The Prime Minister’s attitude of directly targeting mainstream columnists and journalist and the firing practices in the media sector due to this attest to the increasingly authoritarian political orientation of the government. The intolerance toward oppositional voices has increased in recent years. The fact that the government has been using a polarizing and tension-increasing language all the time and not just during election campaigns shows that this language is a conscious choice. In the field of regional politics, the government’s claim to strengthen democracy in the Middle East in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Qatar lacks credibility. Also, although the Syrian regime is obviously killing its own people, the AKP government’s legitimizing its aggressive approach to the Syrian regime on humanitarian grounds does not have much integrity, if it is remembered that this same government had a very friendly relationship with the Syrian regime— particularly in relation to their agreement on the repression of Kurdish dissent. When evaluated together with domestic security issues, the AKP government’s current foreign policy preferences point to even the possibility of an actual war with Syria. And this would mean retrogression in the field of rights and freedoms in the country. The region is on the brink of an explosion, and the problems that persist in countries like Egypt or Libya give enough evidence that toppling dictators is not sufficient for a sustainable social and political stability. The potential of Libya’s turning into another Afghanistan points to the possibility of a similar process in Syria. Besides, considering Turkey’s sectarian foreign policy preferences in the region that favor Sunni Islamists, it is highly possible that tensions with Iran and Iraq would further escalate in the not-so-distant future. These regional developments show that the Kurdish issue has become a simultaneously domestic and foreign policy issue. Aware of that the Arab Spring has impacted Kurdish expectations and demands, Turkey and other countries with a Kurdish problem have been desperately trying to manage the process in order to repress, control or contain Kurdish struggles. These regional developments have made the government’s Kurdish policy more complicated and inconsistent. On the one hand, it is trying to collaborate with some Kurdish groups in its fight against the PKK. On the other hand, it is unwilling to meet joint demands of all Kurds—such as mother tongue education and decentralization—fearing that they would violate the ‘‘red lines’’ of the Turkish Republic. The government finds it necessary to make an alliance with the Kurds of Iraq and some Kurdish groups in Syria so as to come out ahead from the regional crisis, but in order for such an approach to mean something in practice Turkey needs to solve its own Kurdish problem in a democratic way. The AKP government has so far been very hesitant in this regard. To conclude, if the multiply tried and failed strategy of settling the Kurdish issue by repression is left aside, we are left with the options of either managing or resolving the issue. For the past 10 years, the AKP government’s main preference has been to spread the solution of the problem out over time by managing and manipulating expectations. However, coupled with the political developments at the

123

The paradox of Kurdish problem

169

regional scale, the rising Kurdish discontent within Turkey makes it no longer likely to get positive returns from such politics of management and manipulation. Every passing day there is an increasing need to take radical steps for an acceptable and sustainable solution. In fact, this is the only alternative to prevent the Kurdish problem from turning into the grounding for a civil war. A constitutional solution shaped by such an alternative political reason and social conscience is the only way to prevent new dead bodies coming from the mountains. Brushing over Kurdish demands for mother tongue education with elective courses and the right to selfdetermination with strengthening local governments will only putrefy the problem. The constitution is a major reason underlying the Kurdish problem. A new constitution built upon a foundational will of equal coexistence may be the right place to start crafting a solution toward building a just peace.

123