The Urban Review January 1972

THE NEWARK TEACHERS' STRIKE By Fred Berbaro

Fred Barbaro is Assistant Professor of Community Organizing and Planning at the Columbia University School of Social Work. He was formerly the associate director of the Urban League of Essex County and executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey. Although all interpretations and conclusions are his alone, the author is grateful to Dr. George La Noue, Associate Professor of Politics and Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, f o r his thoughtful and perceptive suggestions.

The strike by the Newark Teachers Union from February 1 to April 17, 1971 was the longest teachers' strike in the history of a major American city. One reason for its length and intensity was the emergence of a new kind of educational politics in the black community that now dominates Newark. Conflicts between teacher organizations, community groups, and boards of education have taken on new dimensions since such cities as Newark, Gary, East St. Louis, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. have achieved black majorities, and the black populations of Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, and St. Louis have grown to more than 40 percent. 1 The events in Newark may suggest future patterns of behavior by minority and majority groups in these cities. At least two distinct patterns became discernible in the course of the Newark strike. The black majority directly challenged the collective bargaining machinery that has proved to be, on balance, a successful vehicle in bringing order to labor-management disputes in the private sector. The white minority, on the other hand, recognized the potential of the community control concept in advancing its own goals and in effect converted that concept, developed to assist blacks, to its own advantage. The following two hypotheses drawn from these developments will be explored here: (1) Blacks can be expected to reject collective bargaining machinm2¢ as being inappropriate in their struggle against discrimination and other racist practices. The traditional liberal reforms of civil service examinations and hearings with due process will be viewed as mechanisms designed for another era to benefit another group but now being used to frustrate the will of the new majority through maintenance of the status quo. (2) The community control concept is not only a vehicle for advancing black aspirations but also a path that can be taken by any numerical minority in protecting its interests and advancing its goals. As blacks increasingly gain control over the schools and political machinery in the cities, whites can be expected to seek separatist solutions under the umbrella of community control and, in extreme cases, secession. Of course, these hypotheses cannot be fully tested within the confines of a single city and with the resources available to the author. By utilizing journalistic accounts of the event, personal interviews with informed individuals directly and indirectly involved in the dispute, a review of relevant documents, and the author's personal knowledge of the city's political history, some evidence relating to these hypotheses can be identified. Given the explosive nature of race-school relations in our largest cities, it is useful to begin thinking about these problems even if the data are still fragmented. The New Majority Inherits a Troubled City

In 1960 Newark had a population of 405,000 of

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which 34.4 percent was nonwhite. Early reports from the 1970 U.S. Census indicate that the population trends in Newark will be similar to those reported for other large cities across the country: i.e., a decrease in total numbers and a sharp decline in the number of white middle class families. By 1970 Newark had lost approximately 20,000 inhabitants; its black and Spanish-speaking populations approached 60 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Italian-Americans are numerically the largest white group in the city, with Irish-Americans, descendants of East European immigrants, and a small Jewish community accounting for the rest. Long before blacks elected their first mayor in 1970, teacher organizations fought the Board of Education over the poor conditions in the schools and for higher wages. In addition to the continual struggle against the board, teacher organizations battled each other in a series of elections dating back to December 1964. Not, however, until November 1969, .following the New York City teachers' strike, did the Newark Teachers Union (NTU) eliminate the local affiliate of the New Jersey Education Association, the Newark Teachers Association, as a serious contender for the loyalty of Newark teachers by soundly defeating them by an almost 4-1 margin. Three months after its victory, the union launched a strike. Hugh J. Addonizio, the mayor at that time, had just been indicted by a grand jury and was fighting not only for his political life but for his freedom; he could not afford a prolonged strike and so pushed through a one-year contract. Some segments of the black community were infuriated with its provisions for binding arbitration and the elimination of nonprofessional chores. When Addonizio was retired from office in June 1970, these issues were bound to surface. Three and one-half years after his first, unsuccessful bid for mayor, Kenneth A. Gibson, a civil engineer, was nominated by a black and Puerto Rican convention. The city was in the midst of a long-brewing scandal, with the mayor and several city officials on trial on corruption charges. Gibson won a run-off election and rose overnight from an obscure figure to a national celebrity. However, the Italian white minority in the city retained its control of the City Council by a 6-3 margin. But even as blacks achieved nominal political power in Newark, it was becoming questionable whether they would accrue any substantial benefits. Some theorists concluded that the rewards would be minimal, at least as compared with the gains of earlier ethnic groups. Newark's dire financial situation was further aggravated by the drive by reformers for metropolitan solutions to difficult problems, the centralization of funding resources at the federal level, and the emergence of militant public employee organizations. In other words, by the time blacks acquired the means of power on a city level, such power was no longer effective to deal with local problems. Those prob-

lems still subject to local solutions had in effect been removed from the control of black politicians by previously established institutions originally designed to benefit, and now controlled by, the former majority. For a black mayor and black power advocates, these realities have been a constant source of frustration. The new black majority found that Aid to Dependent Children and other federally funded welfare programs were administered by the county and the state. Although a reorganization of the police department was a high priority, political reality militated against any drastic moves while tension between the races remained high and the crime rate continued to climb. The fire department was already overstaffed, closing out that avenue for black job mobility. Antipoverty and Model Cities programs provided opportunities for some jobs, but federal guidelines often dictated educational requirements that local residents could not meet. Public works programs were limited by the cutback in funds caused by the recession. Civil service protected city employees, and the white-dominated City Council protected the jobs of non-civil service employees held over from the last administration. That left the schools-certainty no pushover-the most vulnerable to community pressure and a high priority for blacks interested in jobs, in reshaping a city and promoting an ideology. One of Mayor Gibson's first official actions was to appoint four new members to the Board of Educationthree blacks and one Puerto Rican who, together with a black holdover from the Addonizio administration, gave the black-Puerto Rican coalition a 5-4 voting majority on the board. The new coalition, although representing varying age groups and diverse economic and educational backgrounds, was united in its criticism of the educational system in Newark and convinced of the need for change. Jesse Jacob, the newly elected president of the board who for years had been active in school politics, was particularly outspoken in his condemnation of the NTU and the previous board. NTU President Carol Graves promptly attacked Gibson for what she considered to be an anti-union appointment. The coalition spoke for critics who had had little influence over Board of Education policies in the past and who now saw themselves in a unique position to serve as advocates for black and Puerto Rican children. These critics should not be confused with professional educators, black or white, who had also been critics of the board. Gittell and Hevesi have spelled out the differences between the professionals who tend to emphasize administrative changes and those in the lay community who seek more fundamental changes: T h e . . . m o r e vocal group of reformers is predominantly made up of nonprofessionals living in, or identified with, the ghettos. They are, to a large extent, community leaders and ghetto dwellers who reject administrative reform and demand a complete

The Newark Teachers' Strike

redistribution of power; to effect such a distribution, they stress the techniques of decentralization of school systems and community control. The reformers in t h i s . . , group no longer accept the values imposed on educational systems by middie-class reformers of past decades, the purpose of which was the separation of education from partisan politics. They reject the traditional middle-class reform ethos that stressed non-partisan elections, pubhc authorities, and professional control of public policy. They argue that these values, laudable within the context of their original purpose, answer neither the needs of the 1960's nor the interests of a powerless, uninvolved population. Moreover, the ends sought by middle-class reform tradition-standardized procedures, merit promotions, appointment through objective examinations, specialization of function, and centralized leadership-are now considered instruments of maintaining the system; they are the means whereby ghetto residents are excluded from a role in that system and they are contributory factors in the educational failure of ghetto children.2 In a sense, this new call for community control is an updated expression of what has been described as "the ideal of widespread political participation" or "the common man's ability to control his governors," a persistent" theme in American history. 3 Historically' the contending forces have been the mass citizenry and the unresponsive elected officials. Today, the revolt is largely against the professionals-"the people who took charge, in the name of reform and good government, and apparently failed to deliver the goods. In its unwillingness to trust the experts, the demand for decentralization is frontier populism come to the city, a rejection of outside planning and expertise.',4 (Emphasis added.)

- ] A s the professionals in the large bureaucracies became even more unresponsive to the will of the majority (or significant minorities) than elected officials, efforts to strip public employees of their protective, insulating devices were more frequently made. Civil servants responded with increased militancy and increasingly sought to shape the policies of the agencies they worked for as a means of protecting the prerogatives they had become accustomed to exercising. These policies often ran counter to ghetto interests, s In Newark, the binding arbitration provision of the teachers contract became the key obstacle to educational reform in the eyes of the black and Puerto Rican residents whose children now accounted for approximately three out of every four of the 78,000 schoolchildren in the school system. Binding arbitration allowed the NTU to protect its members from political pressure from the community and forestalled the board's attempts to make the personnel and policy changes it felt would benefit the new majority. The stage was set for the dispute when board president Jacob

announced shortly before the strike that the board "could not live with binding arbitration" and thereby delivered the opening salvo in the 11-week strike.

The Binding Arbitration Dispute The struggle between the neo-populist and the professional forces is best exemplified in the Newark situation by the maneuvering of the parties, particularly around the issue of binding arbitration. The issues that divided the board and the NTU were significant. As the time for the expiration of t h e previous contract neared, neither side spoke of cooperatively sitting down together to work out their differences. Both parties approached the deadline in an uncompromising mood. Jacob insisted that negotiations could not begin until the picketing at the schools was stopped and that, legally, with the expiration of the old contract, all items were subject to renegotiation, although he was willing to accept 70 percent of that contract. The teachers insisted that no part of the expired contract was negotiable; they wanted it to be the starting point for negotiations. The union took the traditional stance as both groups began to jockey for position; the board deviated from the script. The board wanted to rescind the provisions for

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binding arbitration and the elimination of nonprofessional chores, but it was in no position to offer a large wage incentive to promote the deal. The NTU could not agree to commit "organizational suicide" by giving up hard-won gains resulting from its first strike in 1970. Both sides wanted the schools to remain open, but the union would only consent if the existing contract were extended while negotiations continued. The board refused because the union would then be in a better position to hold out for a longer period of time while operating under the terms of the contract with its objectionable clauses. The board and the NTU had good reasons not to compromise over the binding arbitration issue. Even before the union won the 1969 representative election, the Newark Teachers Association (NTA) had the frustrating experience of seeking court remedies to enforce its contract with the board which took over one year to litigate. The NTU saw three of its teachers transferred after a confrontation at South Eighth Street School for refusing to perform nonprofessional chores. The issue went to arbitration and the teachers were upheld but were transferred nevertheless for being "insensitive to the community." The transfers did not cause a strike as they did ~n New York City, but the union demanded that "insensitive to the community" be defined. The expression, as used by some blacks, describes what they believe to be a lack of empathy on the part of white teachers for black needs, culture, or special problems. Union officials tended to view the term as a convenient mechanism to rid the schools of white teachers who would not respond to community pressures. Newark school superintendent Franklyn Titus, in defending the Board of Education's decision to abolish the examination for principals and other supervisory personnel, said that a higher premium would be put on "sensitivity" in the selection of school administrators. He defined sensitivity as "that element of a person's personality which makes him aware of the problems that are unique to the ghetto, unique to the circumstances surrounding being a member of a minority g r o u p . . , sensitivity to educational needs that grow out of the deprived conditions.., in most of our neighborhoods. ''6 The NTU noted that 110 school districts in the state had binding arbitration clauses in their contracts. Union President Carol Graves emphasized that without binding arbitration "the board would be able to do whatever it wanted with teachers," in terms of involuntary transfers and promotions. "We can't depend on the Board of Education's word even in a contract," she said, "because the weight of evidence is against them in the number of grievances we have had to file. ''7 During the past year when eight disputes were reportedly filed, the arbitrator made six awards to the union and two to the Board of Education. The board did not hire teacher aides to relieve teachers of nonprofessional duties, a provision of the old contract.

The board responded by stating that binding arbitration was a device used by the union to keep the community from having a say in the school system and a way for the union to take over control of the schools. The NTU shot back that it was LeRoi Jones, leader of black community militants, who, with the board's help, was trying to gain control of the schools. Basically the board, intent on reversing past gains achieved by teachers and on asserting itself in areas it considered to be the prerogative of management, did not expect to win many disputes put to arbitration. This position was based not only on the previously cited experiences, but on a working knowledge of the arbitration procedure. Mediation, which is a voluntary process, leaves the parties free to make their own decision; arbitration is a judicial process, and its award is binding on the parties. Management, in a strong bargaining position, does not look to collective bargaining to ascertain its rights. "It looks to the agreement to find out which and how many of its fights and powers it has conceded outright or agreed to share with the union. ''~ Unions are aware of this "theory of management reserved rights" and usually are reluctant to accept arbitration; but in the area of public education, "management's rights" are ambiguous. The union may agree that the board has a right to judge competence, for example, but it may not agree on the methods employed to make the decision. The arbitrator does not have the latitude the mediator has in bringing about a settlement. Mediation intensifies negotiation; arbitration stops it. The arbitrator must decide on (1) the written agreement, (2) the record developed in the testimony, and (3) the submission agreement, submitted in question form which specifies the disputed issue. A poorly worded agreement could result in the loss of an award regardless of its merit. Prasow and Peters sum up the role of the arbitrator: The arbitrator must render the mutual intent of the parties, whether or not he approves of that intent. He must ascertain that intent, not through his own independent investigation, but from the record made by the parties themselves, as presented to him at a formal arbitration hearing. The parties must be given full opportunity to testify, to present evidence, and to cross-examine those who testify and present evidence against them. The arbitrator must base his decision on that record, and only within narrow limits can he take judicial notice of facts not introduced into the record. Whatever the record, all roads must lead to a single basic objective-the interpretation and application of the collective agreement. The arbitrator must be bound by the agreement and may not reform it by adding to or subtracting from its written provisions. 9 Without debating the merits of the procedure, its class bias can be acknowledged. One can understand why community people would have some difficulty identifying

The Newark Teachers" Strike

with a process that appears to reward only those who have developed the highly technical skills necessary to participate in the process. Once again the board's fear that outside intervention could only erode its control over the school system and prevent reforms was substantiated. After eight frustrating weeks, the mediator resigned and returned to New York; but before he left, he offered the following terms: 1. Binding arbitration be retained with slightly different language being used and a panel of four New Jersey arbitrators to decide disputes on a rotating basis. 2. Teachers be relieved of nonprofessional chores (which were spelled out) and more aides hired. 3. A no-reprisal clause. 4. $500 salary increase in second year of two-year contract. 5. $100 and $200 contributions to a teacher welfare fund in the first and second year respectively. 6. A proposal to help long-term substitutes obtain regular positions. 7. A salary increase for clerks and aides. 8. A curriculum review with board, union, parent and community participation. 9. Sickle cell anemia and lead poisoning tests. 10. Draft counseling in high schools. 11, Retention in the contract of all provisions not amended or revised. The mediator most likely based his proposals not only on awards in former Newark contracts but also on awards received by other teachers unions. Although pubfished awards cannot be considered as binding precedents, they do have an impact similar in effect to the influence of common law on a judge's decisions. The extent of the influence may depend on a number of intangibles, but one thing is certain: the arbitrator, who must deal with the evidence at hand, is not likely to take into consideration our post-Reconstruction history of discrimination, the aspirations of black people, compensatory treatment proposals, or black power. The politically astute NTU leadership did not claim victory. They "rellactantly" agreed to the terms, which the board suggested should serve as the basis for further negotiations. When the Mayor appointed a mediation panel, the union promptly called the move a "breach of faith" and refused to join the sessions. The Strike Settlement As the strike continued, racial polarization in the city increased to dangerous proportions. Mayor Gibson con-

vinced one of his appointees to vote with the white minority and accept the mediator's recommendations. At the public hearing, however, blacks packed the meeting and began to pressure board member Charles Bell into maintaining the solidarity of the black-Puerto Rican coalition. The meeting was recessed when fighting broke out between union members and Community blacks. On the following evening, Bell voted to reject the offer and was embraced by Jacob who announced that this was the "year of attrition." Bell resigned from his job as an official of a New York City municipal employees union, an incident that was one of several indicating that organized labor beyond Newark's borders realized it had a stake in the outcome of the strike. UFT President Albert Shanker, civil rights and labor advocate Bayard Rustin, AFT President David Selden and national AFL-CIO representatives (suggesting George Meany's interest) spoke at the weekly teachers rallies. In addition, the state AFL-CIO, United Auto Workers Union, and Teamsters Union put aside their differences and united behind the NTU. Their actions consisted of overt and covert involvement in the negotiations, including the threat of a citywide strike that was planned and scheduled but canceled shortly before the deadline. Countering this union pressure, the new majority continued to press its demands, rejecting conventional methods of handling labor disputes, and using the threat of disruption to enforce its position. Ten days later, as the mood in the city became increasingly ugly and union pressure mounted, Charles Bell reversed himself and voted for a "new" proposal submitted by Mayor Gibson, which included the binding arbitration provision. In effect, this development ended the strike. Jacob, bowing to Bell's reversal, as well as to union pressures and the mayor's will, announced that this was a temporary setback; he had lost a battle but not the war. As if to prove his point, parents from the community barred 110 teachers from entering their classes when school reopened, in violation of the no-reprisal clause of the new contract. Teachers were ordered to report to the administrative offices of the Board of Education for possible reassignment. One of the most interesting aspects of teachers' strikes is that not only is the "populist" mood of the black community making some provisions of contracts difficult to enforce but that other groups-public officials and politicians-are beginning to accept the charges made against professionals as legitimate. In the Ocean HillBrownsville situation in New York City, the New York Civil Liberties Union had charged the UFT with using the due process issue as a smokescreen "to obscure its real goal which is to discredit decentralization and sabotage community control. ''1 o During the Spring 1971 session of the New York State Legislature, two provisions to extend the period of granting tenure from three to five years and to

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limit the issues subject to collective bargaining received serious consideration. New Jersey legislators have expressed similar interests. In Newark, Dr. William A. Shine, Assistant Commissioner of the State Education Department's Office of Controversies and Disputes, suggested a solution which amounted to having two black administrators decide which of the barred teachers should remain in their schools or be reassigned. These administrators in effect would be applying the "insensitive to the community test." The board accepted the procedure; the union called it "mob rule." Few, however, expect the NTU to win this point either in arbitration or by threatening another strike. What is most likely is that the will of the new majority ~ prevail, the contract and its protective provisions will be circumvented, and the union's power will decrease. The Reaction of the White Minority

Community control has become a code word in the educational literature and in general usage to describe a situation that will permit blacks to gain access to and authority over the institutions in their segregated communities. The concept began to emerge as white society persisted in reneging on integration. As blacks continued to experience the frustration of implementing the 1954 Supreme Court decision and gaining access to jobs, decent housing, and education, the separatist ideology again became respectable for an increasingly large number of blacks. Black power advocates were joined by white liberals who still professed a desire for integration but saw community control as a necessary step in the process before the long range goal could be achieved. The Newark teachers strike has provided some evidence that strongly suggests it would be desirable to pause at this time to reexamine the implications of a decentralized, community-controlled

educational system as a vehicle for achieving integration in cities where blacks are a majority. The question here is what is to prevent whites as the new minority from seizing the community control concept to advance white goals and frustrate black attempts to consolidate power. It is perhaps understandable, in view of the events of the past decade, for social scientists and educators to be preoccupied with balancing the scales of social justice by advocating positions that appeared likely to benefit blacks. It is also understandable to cite events taking place in New York City as typical of what will happen in other parts of the country. Gittell and Hevesi state: "The political struggle for school reform in New York City very likely reflects the character of the struggle as it will emerge throughout America's urban centers. ''11 In doing so, social scientists have perhaps ignored their own predictions regarding the eventual control of many large cities by blacks. For example, Altshuler's authoritative work on community control traces its roots in white and black American history and focuses on its potential benefits for blacks, t2 But it is conceivable that the principle enunciated could apply to any numerical minority. What is suggested here is that blacks will get more mileage out of the community control concept if it is viewed as a strategic and not a religious ideology, to be used selectively and discarded where it becomes dysfunctional. The call for a decentralized, community controlled school system may be an appropriate strategy for New York City blacks, but this writer would argue that Newark blacks have more to gain by maintaining a responsive centralized system. The nature and extent of white support for the NTU would require the systematic collection and analysis of survey data. Nevertheless, the organized efforts by the whites were overwhelmingly in favor of the union. The board made every effort to keep the schools open. Journalistic reports indicated that" schools in the predominantly white areas were not well attended while those in black areas experienced little disruption of the normal educational routine. Most schools fell in between the extremes of the First Avenue School, which was the only officially closed school, and the Robert Treat School, where few students or teachers were absent. The support of the NTU by white parents did not necessarily indicate that they were satisfied with the education their children were receiving. While some critics of the public schools contend that the schools have failed to serve low income and minority students, others claim that they have failed all students and that those who have experienced "success" in the system have done so because of what they brought to it rather than what they received from it. There is little hard data to support these claims primarily because of the difficulties involved in measurement and, perhaps even more fundamentally, because of disagreement among the critics regarding the purgose of education in our society. The actions Of white Newark

The Newark Teachers" Strike

parents can best be understood within the context of political developments within the city over the past year. By and large these parents, who were either supporters of former Councilman Anthony Imperiale or former Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio, were not necessarily anti-black nor did they all wish to punish Gibson for being victorious; but they were certainly united against what they perceived to be black militants in control of the Board of Education. Since Gibson made these appointments he was held responsible. There is some evidence and certainly a great deal of suspicion that Louis Turco, the white President of the City Council, tried to capitalize on the resentment against Gibson and the frustration created by the strike. Turco was a welcomed speaker at teachers rallies and meetings of white parents. Board member John Cervase, who has a reputation for advocating rightwing causes (e.g., weeding out "radicals and black militants" from the schools), often joined Turco at these meetings. Thus unfolded one of the ironies of the Newark strike: those who supported the racist campaign of Addonizio or the reactionary campaign of Imperiale had captured the middle-ground in the struggle, while Gibson, who held that position during the mayoralty campaign, was considered to be a supporter of extremist elements in the community. This turn of events eventually persuaded Gibson to move to recapture the center position by more forcefully involving himself in the strike, a stance counter to his philosophy regarding the role of the mayor in educational disputes.

- ' ] A s the strike dragged on, the pressure to seek a settlement increased. Attendance at pro-teacher meetings continued to grow as 1,500 supporters at East Side High School on the evening of April 13, heard Turco, Cervase, Imperiale, and other white officials and citizens criticize the board. (The only black speaker was Mrs. Clara Dasher, NTU Vice President, who became the chief negotiator and spokesman for the union during the absence of President Carol Graves.) The meeting was followed by a march of 300 on the board's offices where a board meeting had just been terminated. In an effort to "end racial polarization," Turco and board member and political ally Dr. Michael Petti introduced a decentralization plan. Briefly, five school boards would be created, probably along ward lines, with financial responsibility remaining with the central board. Local boards would be permitted to develop educational programs, select the local superintendent, and assign personnel. Conflicts arising between the local and central boards (the tatter's function being of an advisory nature) would be settled by the State Commission of Education. Turco admitted that the plan was little more than an outline, requiring further study and community input, but the simplicity of its appeal both to white and black

seParatists is insidious. What appeared to be a plan that gave both sides what they wanted in reality decreased the power of blacks, at least in the short run. Although some blacks live in every ward of the city, they are concentrated in the Central and South Wards. The election that brought Gibson to power also resulted in the election of three white and two black councilmen in the ward races. Ward elections for local boards and superintendents are likely to reflect this same alignment of political power. There are other problems with the plan, such as expecting the central board to function only in an advisory capacity while simultaneously maintaining control over the purse strings. The plan would also require the approval of the autonomous Board of Education to be implemented-an unlikely occurrence under present conditions. For these reasons and others, decentralization has not received serious consideration; but it would be foolish to dismiss the plan or Turco's motivation for promoting it. The concept of black power was also dismissed as militant rhetoric when it was first introduced. Since then, events have demonstrated the staying power of an idea whose time has come. This last point is particularly n6teworthy considering the fact that separatist schemes, promoted by whites, are not new in the city. Vailsburg, a predominantly white area of Newark bordering on a suburban community, has been the object of a petition campaign, promoted by some of its residents, to secede from the city. Although the petition was started during the Addonizio administration, it cannot be attributed to a desire to escape corruption since corruption has been a part of city life for years. The mostly white Glen Park section of Gary, Indiana began to circulate a similar petition less than two years after that city elected its first black mayor, because they felt "dealt out of the game.,,13 That open conflict will continue between segments of the black and the white communities and between the Board of Education and the NTU is evident ha the current dispute over involuntary transfer of teachers and in the declaration of Board President Jacob, following the 5-4 vote settling the strike, that he had lost a battle but not the war. It is unlikely that the school system can contain such conflict over a long period of time. Massialas, viewing educational institutions as subsystems within the larger political system, points out that subsystems require both overt and covert support in order to operate, and furthermore, that the failure of the subsystem could lead to the collapse of the larger political system) 4 The demands being made on the Newark schools by white and black militants and all those who fall along the continuum have not only put the school system under stress but could lead to its breakdown. Proposals for a state take-over of the Newark schools have already been made during periods of unrest, most recently during the t971 strike and earlier, following the 1967 civil disorders. The

9

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state, which is constitutionally responsible for providing public education for the state's children, has delegated the administrative responsibility to the local Board of Education. The state legislature is empowered to alter that relationship and institute a decentralized plan. The pressure to do so will mount if an accommodation is not reached between the different forces vying for power and influence in the school system and the city at large. Conclusion

10

The Newark teachers' strike provided evidence that the political struggle to control the school systems in cities having a black majority may characteristically differ from the experiences in large cities politically controlled by whites. Since the future is likely to see more black controlled cities, greater attention should be directed to the study of school controversies in these cities. The Newark experience suggests that while community control may be a slogan to be used opportunistically by both blacks and whites and to be understood as another facet of the struggle taking place between the races, it is also viewed by others as a legitimate strategy for reform of the schools. The reactions of labor, segments of the white community, and some members of the state legislature to the Newark dispute may convince some blacks that short-term strategic considerations require the abandonment of the community control concept in cities where there are black majorities in favor of a demand for a more responsive centralized system. The position taken by the newly appointed black superintendent of schools in Washington, D. C. is instructive in this respect. Superintendent Hugh J. Scott has stated that granting community control at more local schools would be "the worst thing that could happen to the city school system. There would be more community involvement in the schools but not control. I don't support having local school boards across the city. I don't want enclaves of weakness and strength where the strong get stronger and the weak weaker. The school system is so disorganized and divided now that we must pull together. The school syster~ needs strong leadership from downtown. ''1 s There is another question that the strike in Newark raises. To what limits will teacher organizations and school boards press their claims? If we can assume (and it is not altogether clear that we can) that both sides honestly would welcome a reconciliation of their differences and not seek'to accelerate the conflict to the point where educational functions are continuously disrupted, a basic understanding between the adversaries must be reached. Which concerns are racially free, allowing for routine resolution, and which issues strike at the very heart of the educational process? What safeguards for its members does a union legitimately require that are not legacies of past protectionist practices perpetuating privileges at the expense of educational reform?

The answers to these questions are difficult. Honest disagreements between the parties involved may account, in part, for the length and bitterness of these disputes. If every position filled and every administrative decision made is to be considered within the context of a racial struggle or as part of a pattern of accumulating privileges unrelated to the primary function of an educational institution, then the resolution of these differences will absorb the total energies of all parties, leaving precious Iittte time for the main business at hand. Some will insist that it is not possible to proceed to other considerations until these issues are settled since they have a direct bearing on the educational quality of the schools. There is some truth in this sentiment but it is difficult to see from the results of the Newark dispute how the goals of either side were advanced or how either the union or the board gained a clear advantage. What is clear is that the struggle goes on, simply moving to different arenas, and that neither the mayor, union leaders, board members, or parents appear confident that there will not be another strike when the present contract expires. [ ] Notes and References

1. The New York Times, July 6, 1971,p. 1. 2. Gittell, Marilyn and Alan G. Hevesi, editors. "Editors Introduction" in The Politics of Urban Education. New York: Praeger, 1969, p. 9. 3. Altshuler, Alan A., Community Control. New York: Pegasus, 1970. 4. Schrag, Peter, "Why Our Schools Have Failed," Commentary, XLV (March, 1968), p. 35. 5. Piven, Frances Fox, "Militant Civil Servants," Transaction (November, 1969), p. 24. 6. The American Jewish Committee-Anti-Defamation League, "Porcelli v. Titus," Joint Memorandum, No. 434. October 30, 1969, p. 2.

7. The Evening News, March 28, 1971, p. 8. 8. Prasow, Paul and Edward Peters, Arbitration and Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

9. Ibid., p.t 2. lO. New York Civil Liberties Union, "The Burden of Blame" in Gittell and Hevesi, op. cir., p. 339. 11. Gittell and Hevesi, op. eit., p. 14. 12. Altshuler, op. cir., chapter II. 13. TheNew York Times, April 13, 1969, p. 50. 14. Massialas, Byron G.: Education and the Political System. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 2O6, p. 209. 15. The Washington Post, March 2, 1971, p. C1.