Journal of Fusion Energy, Vol. I0, No. 4, 1991

The Quest for Fusion Energy Renso CaporalP

9 Is the Department of Energy prepared to finance near-term industrial participation, when commercial payoff is still uncertain? 9 Will industry's input be solicited in the early stages of national and international programs? For example, for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor while agreements among the four parties are being solidified?

James Reston, the former executive editor and Washington columnist of the New York Times, wrote recently in the Times about his fantasy plan for a new American order. An order that would be put into operation on January 1, 2000. The new American order of my imagination didn't contain anything that was not both reasonable and achievable. For example," he writes, "It would have in place by the first day of the new century an energy program that didn't depend on the oil of the Middle East. I thought this was essential, even if we had to rely on the sun, the wind, atomic energy, taxes and horses. I didn't think this was ideal, but it seemed to me more realistic than counting on peace and sanity in the Middle East.

There is no question in the fusion community that fusion has shown continuous scientific success: new milestones are announced at each national and international meeting. And yet, 20 years ago, fusion power was promised to be 30 years away. Today, it's about 40-50 years away. So in some ways, the U.S. fusion program hasn't been successful. Still more distressing is that public interest and support have not been sustained. For instance, the cover story of the April 29, 1991, issue of Time Magazine was on the growing support in this country for nuclear power. This was a 7-page story, outlining the nation's power options. Fusion gets only a backhanded reference, one paragraph, calling it "an alternative energy source that will not become practical for a long time, if it ever does." The National Critical Technologies Panel is appointed by the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Their report to the president said, "Nuclear fusion technology is not considered by the panel to be a current critical technology because of the long development leadtimes anticipated for commercialization." That's not very encouraging, is it? Years of work have brought us to the point of scientific feasibility. But somehow, we have not been able to follow the plan laid out in the Magnetic Fusion Energy Engineering Act of 1980, a plan that called for a demonstration reactor by the turn of the century. What are the reasons for this? Is it the uncertainty

He concludes that nobody listened to his fantasies, of course, saying, " . . . b u t that's one of the nice things about being over 80: you don't care whether they listen, and even when they do, you can't quite hear what they say." Reston has a lot of great ideas for his new American order, including a national anthem that anybody coald sing, drunk or sober, but his call for a sensible energy program is something that all of us can agree with. The program we're betting on is fusion. Over the last 35 years, the United States has spent more than six billion dollars to see if fusion is something we can count on. Today we're at a turning point. The Secretary of Energy is ready for industrial involvement, ready for the fusion program to make the leap from research to development. How well we make the transition depends on answers to certain questions: 9 Is Congress aware of the program's progress and its importance? Because without their faith and support there can be no significant national fusion program. Chairman and CEO, Grumman Corporation, Bethpage, New York 11714.

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of the national budget and public support? Is it the inability to settle on a direction for our efforts? Is it the lack of a centralized fusion program? Or is it a combination of all of these things? With ITER, we now have the opportunity to strengthen these weaknesses: we have an international program that we can support if we can develop a wellfocused domestic program, but that program must include industry. The Burning Plasma Experiment at Princeton, the Inertial Confinement Fusion program, and the other fusion projects can all benefit from the exchange of capabilities between laboratory and industry. Industrial involvement in fusion up to now can be described as light. Unlike Japan, which has a central research establishment and strong industrial presence, our country has chosen a system in which the Department of Energy administers its fusion program through the national laboratories. The contribution the labs have made to fusion research and development and training is unchallenged. But it's no longer enough all by itself. The European arrangement is similar to ours. But now, like the U.S., the Europeans are ready to increase their industrial involvement. The Colombo Report, prepared by the Fusion Evaluation Board for the Commission of European Communities, recommends establishing the means " . . . to place European industry on a level playing field with that in other parts of the world." If we are serious about fusion energy, and we certainly should be, then it is now time for us to do the same. Industrial cost-sharing, quite frankly, is not likely. Industry has contributed to the program in the past, but it is now under considerable financial pressure to cut back on long-range research. In light of current budget realities, industry must be funded. Savings can be realized by encouraging the formation of company consortia, groups of companies that each bring to the table their particular expertise. Later on, when commercial payoff is possible, cost sharing arrangements could work. Sematech, created in 1987, is an example of this kind of technology leveraging. Sematech is a consortium of U.S. semiconductor firms that banded together to counter overseas competition. The federal government put up $100 million, and the consortium matched it. Of course, Sematech has a near-term payoff. For fusion, commercial payoff could be 50 years from now. But there are some other ways to encourage industry to participate in the near term: 9 Make the hard decisions: prioritize programs, and

reorder them. Assess the current list of funded efforts and where they are performed. Modify the list, and the venues, as necessary. That was forced recently by budget cutbacks after the start of this fiscal year, but the reordering should continue. Make the Department of Energy's program authority strong enough to affect the current way we do business. Industry needs to be reassured that there are prospects of a solid program, and that the DOE has the clout to set up contractual arrangements. Centralize U.S. fusion activities. Consolidate the fusion efforts by the national laboratories into a center for fusion energy. This would avoid duplication, enhance control. Reduce budgets and increase efficiency. Secretary Watkins pointed out that nothing would be more counterproductive to the whole field than partisanship by advocates of individual facilities. Some facilities are going to have to make sacrifices so that fusion as a whole can continue to progress.

Superconductor Super Collider is a prime example of a dedicated national facility. It was formed by people from universities and from existing national laboratories, and it relies on industry to develop and produce major portions of the SSC. Industry should be worked into major domestic and international programs at the start of preliminary design or earlier. In the case of international programs, industry can judge what technologies are in our nation's interests before allocations are made among participants. Technology must transfer freely to industry. And, most importantly, intermediate returns from these transfers would encourage industry to participate and then to contribute financially. So how would this work? For example, now that the engineering design activity on ITER is getting underway, it would be appropriate for industry to step up to a leading role in areas such as program management, systems engineering and integration, procurement and production, all of this with support from the labs. Industry is ready to team with the laboratories. Teaming is essential, but it isn't something new. Industry has worked under these arrangements on site at the laboratories, off site on specific tasks, and as prime contractor with the lab as subcontractor. Industry has worked at overseas laboratories, and has also worked directly for the Department of Energy and the Office of Fusion En-

Quest for Fusion Energy ergy. There shouldn't be any problem continuing such arrangements. International programs should be set up as programs of true cooperation. It shouldn't be just internationalparticipation, where everyone is conscious of tuff, and keeps everyone else at arm's length. An efficiently run, wellcoordinated program can multiply each country's budget. I'm aware of the difficulties in setting up an ITER design center. It's understandable that Europe, Japan, and our own country would like ITER to be on home ground. But the right sort of agreement should offer something for everyone. Each work package must include members from each group, dictated by skill, budget, national interest, and by agreement. So, in summary, I offer these suggestions for the program: 9 Work out a truly international, open, cooperative development program. Don't let ITER become a program with four parties working independently, with unnecessary competition and duplication of efforts. And when there is international participation in domestic programs, make sure that our interests are protected; and that it doesn't result in portable technologies taken out of our country for free. 9 Encourage the development of a U.S. fusion industry, and fund industry in the near term for its fusion development work. 9 Get industry involved right from the beginning in international ventures, including those centered in the U.S., so that it has a say in planning and in deciding which technologies are of interest to our country. 9 Set up a program for efficient transition of development work from the laboratory to industry. Survey lab and industry facilities that support or could support fusion. Give industry access to lab

257 facilities, and solicit proposals from industry for new or modified facilities for development work. Finally, use industry's public relations force in combination with that of the laboratories and universities. Let's turn around the perception on Capitol Hill that fusion isn't making any progress. Make sure the American public understands that fusion is a potential power source that would be safe and plentiful. I was listening to the radio recently and heard a speaker named Amory Lovins, an energy and conservation expert, talk about how tough it is to get people to understand the need to conserve water. He said that there was an inevitable cycle: drought, concern, rain, apathy...drought, concern, rain, apathy, and that there were only certain moments in that cycle when people were teachable. And so it is with energy. The war with Iraq is fresh in our nation's memory, and there's a respectable amount of money for fusion in the national budget. But we have to do something with it. We have to produce something, or that money will go away. We made that mistake 10 years ago. In the early 1980s, when another energy crisis was fresh in the national memory, there was even more money set aside for f u s i o n . . . a n d we blew it. A lot of people believed that money was fenced off and untouchable, and they were wrong. The nation grew impatient with the fusion community's inability to produce anything but more research. While groups within the fusion community argued and lectured and fought for turf, the money went away. We didn't like the play the first time around, so let's rewrite the ending. Let's do a better job of working together, universities, laboratories, and industry, and give the country its money's worth.