J Quant Criminol (2016) 32:215–236 DOI 10.1007/s10940-015-9261-x ORIGINAL PAPER
The Scary World of Online News? Internet News Exposure and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice Sean Patrick Roche1 • Justin T. Pickett1 • Marc Gertz2
Published online: 10 July 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Abstract
Objectives A substantial body of literature indicates that certain forms of media consumption may increase anxiety about crime and support for social controls. However, few studies have examined whether Internet news consumption is positively associated with such attitudes. The void is significant given the public’s increasing use of online news sources. This study addresses this research gap. Methods We draw on data from four national surveys conducted between 2007 and 2013, which collectively include interviews with more than 13,000 Americans. Using OLS and logistic regression, we assess the relationships between exposure to traditional and online media and perceptions of victimization risk, support for punitive crime policies, and views about police powers. Results Consistent with prior work, we find positive relationships between exposure to traditional forms of media—television news and crime programming—and anxiety about victimization and support for harsh crime policies. In contrast, Internet news exposure is generally not associated with anxieties about crime or support for getting tough on criminals. However, there is evidence of an interactive relationship between political ideology and Internet news exposure. Conclusions The results provide little support for cultivation theory in the context of Internet news consumption. We discuss the import of our findings, and suggest new lines of research to explore the correlates and the effects of exposure to online news sources. Keywords
Cultivation theory Perceived victimization risk Punitive attitudes Policing
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10940-015-9261-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. & Sean Patrick Roche
[email protected] 1
School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, SUNY, 135 Western Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA
2
College of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
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Introduction This paper uses recently collected national survey data to test predictions derived from cultivation theory and the differential reception thesis about the relationships between Internet news consumption and popular views about criminal risk and social control. Assessing media effects on public attitudes toward crime and justice is important because the public receives much of its information about these issues from media accounts, including news stories and television crime programs (Roberts et al. 2003; Roberts and Stalans 1997). Yet media depictions are biased in systematic ways that exaggerate the blameworthiness of offenders, the deficiencies of the justice system, and the threat of crime in society (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Recognizing this, cultivation theorists argue that media exposure cultivates the view among audience members that the real world mirrors that of media accounts, typified by rising crime and lenient punishments (Gerbner and Gross 1976). Building on this premise, the differential reception thesis predicts that the magnitude of cultivation effects vary across audience members, depending on whether their backgrounds, beliefs, and social environments dispose them to be more or less receptive to media messages (Eschholz et al. 2003; Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). Supporting cultivation theory, previous studies have shown that exposure to traditional media (e.g., newspapers, television news) is associated with greater support for punitive policies, higher confidence in the police, and higher levels of anxiety about victimization (Callanan and Rosenberger 2011; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Goidel et al. 2006; KortButler and Sittner Hartshorn 2011). Consistent with the differential reception thesis, extant research has also documented ‘‘audience effects,’’ such that exposure to traditional media influences the attitudes of some kinds of individuals more than others (Chiricos et al. 1997; Pickett et al. 2015; Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). However, the patterns of audience effects have not been consistent (Eschholz 1997, 2003). In contrast to the scholarship on traditional media, there is a dearth of research examining the impact of Internet news consumption on public attitudes. This is particularly surprising given both the rapidly increasing prevalence of Internet usage in America (Perrin and Duggan 2015), and the fact that many Americans now use the Internet as a primary news source (Pew Research Center 2012; US Department of Commerce 2011). Evidence suggests that the Internet is ‘‘on track to equal, or perhaps pass, television as the main source of national and international news within the next few years’’ (Pew Research Center 2012, p. 2). The Internet is also quickly becoming a significant source of information about local news and community crime, especially among young people (Rosenstiel et al. 2011). Theoretically, one might expect Internet news exposure to play a unique role in the social construction of attitudes and beliefs. Online news content may be less regulated, can be supplemented with an array of additional information sources, and allows for increased user agency (Beale 2006; Kim 2008). The present study investigates the effect of Internet news consumption on public attitudes about both crime and justice. We also evaluate whether, as the differential reception thesis predicts, audience effects emerge for the relationship between Internet news consumption and public opinion. Notably, in examining these questions, this study answers recent calls for research to assess if Internet usage is associated with popular views about criminal offending and the law (Beale 2006; Melican and Dixon 2008; Thompson 2010).
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Theoretical and Empirical Background Most Americans have little direct experience with crime or the justice system, so their understanding of criminal justice issues is shaped largely by media accounts (Roberts et al. 2003; Surette 2011). However, media portrayals are characterized by a heavy reliance on police sources, and are specifically geared toward stories that sell. Media coverage focuses on violent offenses, especially the rarest and most serious types of crime, and tends to ignore the contextual causes of offending (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). It also inaccurately depicts the demographics of both offenders and victims, and disproportionately reports on instances where law enforcement authorities fail to protect the public or to ensure just punishments for offenders (Beckett and Sasson 2004; Dixon and Linz 2000a). Not least, the percentage of media stories that focus on criminal events is largely uncorrelated with actual rates of offending, creating the perception that crime rates are always rising (Beckett 1997; Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). Cultivation theory, recognizing the systematically biased depictions of social issues in the media, postulates that people who are regularly exposed to these accounts will come to hold distorted perceptions of social reality (Gerbner and Gross 1976; Gerbner et al. 1980). Although developed to explain television effects, cultivation theory has been extended to an array of other forms of media (see e.g., Lubbers et al. 2000; Williams 2006). Indeed, while Gerbner et al.’s (1977, 1980) research focused on television consumption, they were most concerned with the effects of exposure to certain types of content, irrespective of medium. Much of their research examined the ‘‘violence profile’’ and the ‘‘violence index’’—measures of the frequency and intensity of violence on television. Their primary reasoning for why the television may be the most important medium had to do not with the presentation style, but the age when people starting using the medium: ‘‘other media are accessible to the individual only after the socializing functions of home and family life have begun’’ (Gerbner et al. 1980, p. 14). Today, the Internet is a medium that is heavily used by young people, and at very early ages, potentially increasing the effect of Internet content on users’ attitudes and beliefs (Pew Research Center 2012). The theoretical assumption underlying cultivation theory is that heavy media consumption, when it involves exposure to criminal justice content, ‘‘virtually monopolizes and subsumes other sources of information’’ (Gerbner et al. 1980, p. 14), cultivating anxieties about crime as well as a worldview that is ‘‘demanding [of] protection and even welcoming [of] repression in the name of security’’ (Gerbner et al. 1979, p. 196). Accordingly to this theoretical account, media use should be positively associated with perceived victimization risk, as well as with support for ‘‘get tough’’ crime control policies. Corresponding to this prediction, studies find that persons who regularly consume national and local television news, and crime reality and drama programs, tend to be more fearful of crime (Chiricos et al. 1997, 2000; Dowler 2003; Eschholz et al. 2003) and more supportive of punitive juvenile and criminal justice policies (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Goidel et al. 2006; Kort-Butler and Sittner Hartshorn 2011; Rosenberger and Callanan 2011). Theoretical scholarship on audience effects has advanced cultivation theory by suggesting that the meanings in media portrayals may be received and retained in dissimilar ways by individuals, according to their past experiences, beliefs, and social contexts (Eschholz 1997). The associated empirical work on audience effects has tested four different versions of what can be broadly termed the ‘‘differential reception thesis.’’ The first of these, the substitution hypothesis, holds that media effects are stronger for persons without relevant personal experience, such as non-victims, and those living in lower crime
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areas (Liska and Baccaglini 1990; Weaver and Wakshlag 1986), while the resonance hypothesis postulates the opposite (Doob and Macdonald 1979; Gerbner et al. 1980). The affinity hypothesis predicts that effects are greatest for those who resemble the typical victims shown in media crime stories (Chiricos et al. 1997; Gerbner et al. 1979). By contrast, the vulnerability hypothesis anticipates that media effects are largest for people who may feel more vulnerable to crime, such as females and the elderly (Skogan and Maxfield 1981). Collectively, these findings suggest two broad conclusions. First, there is strong evidence of audience effects. When samples are disaggregated by demographic, attitudinal, and contextual characteristics, media consumption exerts dissimilar effects on attitudes across different groups of respondents (Callanan 2012; Callanan and Rosenberger 2011; Chiricos et al. 1997; Eschholz et al. 2003). Second, the exact pattern of audience effects is inconsistent, yielding few insights about which of the four sub-hypotheses is most accurate (Eschholz 1997, 2003). For example, some investigations find that victims, minorities, and residents of high-crime areas are most affected by media consumption (Chiricos et al. 2000; Doob and Macdonald 1979; Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). Others have show essentially the reverse (Liska and Baccaglini 1990; Weaver and Wakshlag 1986). Still other studies reveal gender differences, with scholars finding conflicting evidence that men (Heath and Petraitis 1987) or women (Chiricos et al. 1997; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Pickett et al. 2015) are most affected by media messages. Of particular relevance here, however, is the fact that prior research testing cultivation theory and the differential reception thesis has primarily focused on consumption of traditional forms of media, such as television shows or newspaper stories. In addition, previous studies assessing the differential reception thesis have most commonly evaluated fear of crime or perceived victimization risk, rather than attitudes toward the justice system or views about criminal sanctions. Thus, as we elaborate below, it is not yet known whether Internet news consumption is related to views about crime and justice. Nor is it clear whether, as is the case with traditional media usage, the strength of the associations between Internet news exposure and those public attitudes varies across different groups of respondents.
Internet Usage, Online News Consumption, and Public Attitudes Internet access has rapidly become ubiquitous in America. Rainie (2010, p. 2) reports that between 2000 and 2010, the number of adult Internet users in the US increased by 72 %, and the number with broadband Internet access in their home increased by 1180 %. As a result, 84 % of all Americans are now Internet users (Perrin and Duggan 2015), and fewer than one-third of citizens lack broadband access at home (US Department of Commerce 2011). In addition, whereas virtually no cell phones were capable of connecting to the Internet in 2000, now well over half of the roughly 90 % of Americans who own cell phones use them to access online content (Rainie 2010; Duggan 2013). This explosion in digital venues has had a pronounced impact on America’s news consumption: ‘‘About half (46 %) of the public says they get news online three days a week or more, with about a third (32 %) going online for news every day’’ (Pew Research Center 2012, p. 18). Between 2010 and 2012, the number of Americans who reported using only a traditional media source in the previous day to obtain news dropped to just one-third, a decline of 18 % (Pew Research Center 2012). And the public now uses the Internet for more than just
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regional or national news. A 2011 survey that investigated where Americans get local news found that the Internet, particularly among young people, was an increasingly important source of information about a range of local issues, including community crime, neighborhood events, and local government activities and court trials (Rosenstiel et al. 2011). Still, neither the Internet’s overwhelming popularity, nor its seeming endless array of content, makes it inherently important for theory or policy. This is particularly true if people merely use new technology in old ways—replacing the old television with a smartphone screen but still viewing the same content. Certainly, television and Internet have similarities. As noted earlier, the Internet is the only media system (besides television) that people begin to use at a very early age (Pew Research Center 2012; Rideout et al. 2010), a characteristic that potentially makes both the Internet and television important shapers of worldviews. Yet there is also a growing body of literature suggesting people locate and consume Internet news differently than news from traditional sources (Althaus and Tewksbury 2002; Krimsky 2007; Mythen 2010). First, the Internet gives individuals much more discretion over when, where, and how they get information (Kim 2008; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009; Rainie 2010). It allows for a personalized news experience, supplemented by an increasing reliance on social networks (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012). A Pew report reveals that among the majority of Americans who are Internet users, more than one-quarter use a personally customized news page, and nearly the same number have set up their accounts to alert them about breaking news (Rainie 2010, p. 16). Second, from 2010 to 2012, the number of Americans who regularly use social network sites to obtain news grew by nearly 186 %, with the result that in 2012, approximately one-fifth of all US residents reporting doing so (Pew Research Center 2012, p. 23). Social networks, Rainie explains, are ‘‘sentries, filters, curators, and distribution channels of news’’ (2010, p. 24). Further, they allow people to take part in shaping the news themselves—recent survey data show that approximately fifty percent of social media users share or repost news stories or related news media, and almost half (46 %) discuss news issues or events on social media (Pew Research Center 2014, p. 5). Third, the Internet provides an overwhelming variety of competing perspectives, many of which are relatively uncensored. As Beale notes ‘‘the sheer volume of information on the Internet offers endless access to resources, including vast archive systems… [and] the Internet’s lack of regulation allows entrepreneurial news vendors to publish ‘blogs’ to reach thousands of news consumers’’ (2006, p. 439). It is thus surprising that so little empirical attention has been directed to whether Internet news consumption influences popular attitudes about crime and justice. Indeed, to our knowledge, the only direct public opinion evidence that can be brought to bear on this issue has derived from Weitzer and Kubrin’s (2004) seminal study of media effects on fear of crime.1 Analyzing data from a 2001 survey of 480 residents of Washington, DC, Weitzer and Kubrin (2004) find that respondents who identify the Internet as their most important news source are no more likely than others to feel uncomfortable walking alone at night near their homes. However, as we note, both the extent and nature of Internet news consumption has changed dramatically since 2001 (Pew Research Center 2012; Rainie 2010). Additionally, Weitzer and Kubrin’s (2004) investigation focuses solely on residents of a single city—a city that has historically had a relatively high rate of violent offending. 1
Although not examining public attitudes, two recent studies of college students separately explored whether the amount of Internet news exposure influenced students’ fear of crime (Kohm et al. 2012) and punitive attitudes (Waid-Lindberg et al. 2011). The two studies provided little evidence that Internet news consumption significantly impacted students’ views. Another recent study analyzed data from a convenience sample of Washington state residents and found that general Internet usage, rather than Internet news consumption specifically, was unrelated to support for the death penalty (Britto and Noga-Styron 2014).
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Thus it is unclear whether their findings are generalizable either to the present day or to Americans broadly. As important, their study does not assess whether Internet news exposure has any association with views about crime policy.
The Current Study The Internet has quickly grown into a significant source for the news, and may eventually become the predominant news media platform in the US. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that individuals begin using the Internet at a very early age, that the Internet allows users to more actively shape their news experiences, and that it provides them with content that may be less censored or fact-checked than that available from other sources. Put simply, the Internet allows news consumers to find virtually unlimited amounts of news about crime. It imposes very few barriers to accessing explicit materials, such as video recordings of brutally violent victimizations. Moreover, through social media, the Internet provides an arena where users can access news items that have been recommended by friends and acquaintances, and where users can ‘‘own the news’’ by: (1) posting links to news stories on their social media accounts, (2) sharing news items with other people, and/ or (3) commenting on news stories. In all of these cases, higher levels of personal engagement with the news may increase its salience or memorability. There are therefore strong theoretical reasons to believe that Internet news could be a powerful shaper of public opinion on crime and justice issues. At the same time, like other media, the Internet provides increased access to non-crimerelated news content, such as news about celebrities, sports, finance/business, and social and cultural events (e.g., music, art, and literature). However, relative to other media, the Internet would seem to allow users the greatest discretion over the types of content that they access. Theoretically, then, assuming high public interest in criminal justice issues, there may be an especially strong correlation between Internet news exposure and criminal justice attitudes, because users may choose to consume more crime news.2 However, if the public’s general interest in criminal justice news is low, the association between Internet news exposure and criminal justice attitudes may be weak or nonexistent. We use national survey data to test two theoretically driven hypotheses. First, in keeping with cultivation theory, we test the prediction that Internet news consumption will be positively associated with perceived victimization risk, support for harsh criminal punishments, and support for increasing police officers’ investigative powers. For comparative purposes, we also examine the associations between television news and crime programming and these attitudes. Second, in accordance with prior scholarship on the differential reception thesis, we predict Internet news consumption will be dissimilarly related to attitudes when respondents are disaggregated according to their demographic and attitudinal characteristics. However, we do not formally hypothesize a specific pattern of audience effects because, as discussed above, prior research provides inconsistent evidence about which of the four versions of the differential reception thesis—substitution, resonance, vulnerability, or affinity—constitutes the most accurate theoretical model (Pickett et al. 2015).
2
The argument here is not that perceived victimization risk or attitudes toward crime control affect Internet news consumption, but rather that general interest in crime news, relative to other news content, may affect Internet news consumption.
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Methods Overview Similar to previous studies (see e.g., Pickett et al. 2012; Quillian and Pager 2001), we test our research questions using data from several independent samples. Specifically, we draw on data from four separate national surveys. Using multiple samples helps to ensure the robustness of findings across variation in both the measurement of variables and sample composition. Further, testing hypotheses by ‘‘including multiple studies with different methodologies’’ in a single article may ‘‘expand the generalizability of primary findings’’ and also ‘‘reduce false-positive rates of findings to a substantial degree’’ (Murayama et al. 2014, p. 110). Specifically, two of our samples (Samples 1 and 2) were general population samples interviewed via telephone, whereas two samples (Samples 3 and 4) were comprised of Internet users who completed online questionnaires. The analyses include four dependent variables that measure respondents’ attitudes about crime and justice. The first three dependent variables—Police Powers, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Victimization Risk—are mean indexes, derived from multiple numerical items that were measured on scales of either 1–10, 0–10, or 0–100. Consistent with prior research (Hogan et al. 2005; Lane and Fox 2012; Pickett and Baker 2014), we treat these mean indices as functionally continuous in our analyses. The fourth dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of support for the death penalty. The key independent variable in this study is respondents’ exposure to Internet news (Internet News). However, we also measure television media consumption (National TV News, Local TV News, and TV Crime Programs) for comparison purposes. The four media consumption measures are operationalized differently across the samples, and some of the TV news variables are only available for certain samples. We measure news exposure broadly, focusing on consumption of news generally rather than on consumption of specific types of news. While consistent with previous studies, this approach is not without limitations. We discuss this issue further in the conclusion. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses are provided in the online supplement.
Sample 1 Participants Sample 1 was interviewed as part of a nationally representative random-digit-dialing (RDD) telephone survey conducted with adult (18 years or older) residents of the US in 2010. Oppenheim Research administered the survey, which resulted in 961 completions and had an overall response rate of 35 %. These response rates are typical of those obtained in public opinion studies published in recent years (see, e.g., King and Wheelock 2007; Wang 2012).3 In order to ensure the quality of the resulting data, the survey was fielded with computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), employed random withinhousehold respondent selection, and required supervisors to verify answers in a proportion of interviews.
3
Response rates to surveys now commonly fall far below the 40 % mark (McCarty et al. 2006). Fortunately, there is now clear evidence that survey response rates themselves are not predictive of nonresponse bias in resultant data (Groves and Peytcheva 2008; Keeter et al. 2006).
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Measures Police Powers assesses views about efforts to expand police officers’ investigative powers. The variable is an index (a = .82) equal to a respondent’s mean level of support (1 = not at all supportive, 10 = very supportive) for: (1) ‘‘Allowing police officers to stop and question individuals based on the way they look’’; (2) ‘‘Making it easier for police officers to search individuals’ cars and homes’’; (3) ‘‘Allowing police officers to use more force against suspects.’’ Punitive Attitudes measures support for ‘‘get tough’’ juvenile justice policies. The variable is an index (a = .82) indicating one’s mean level of support (1 = not at all supportive, 10 = very supportive) for seven polices (e.g., ‘‘Trying more juvenile offenders in adult courts’’). Perceived Victimization Risk is measured as a six-item index (a = .90) indicating a respondent’s mean perceived probability (1 = not at all likely, 10 = very likely) of either personally falling victim, or having a family member fall victim, to six crimes (e.g., auto theft, burglary, murder). The media measures (Internet News, National TV News, Local TV News, and TV Crime Programs) are equal to the number of hours a week a respondent spends, respectively: (1) ‘‘looking at current events and public issues on the internet’’; (2) ‘‘watching national evening news like CNN’’; (3) ‘‘watching local television news’’; (4) ‘‘watching crime programs (such as Law and Order, CSI, or COPS).’’ Because the measures are skewed, we use the natural log of these measures in the regression models.
Sample 2 Participants Sample 2 was interviewed as part of a nationally representative random-digit-dialing (RDD) telephone survey conducted with adult (18 years or older) residents of the US in December 2009 and January 2010. The Research Network administered the survey, which resulted in 520 completions and had a response rate of 30 %. Like Sample 1, this survey was fielded using CATI, random within-household respondent selection, and answer verification for a proportion of the interviews.
Measures Punitive Attitudes is an index (a = .85) indicating one’s mean level of support (0 = not at all supportive, 10 = very supportive) for six punitive policies (e.g., ‘‘Trying more juvenile offenders in adult courts’’). Perceived Victimization Risk is measured as a six-item index (a = .90) indicating a respondent’s mean perceived probability (0 = not at all likely, 10 = very likely) of either personally falling victim, or having a family member fall victim, to six crimes (e.g., auto theft, robbery, murder). For this sample, the media measures (Internet News, Local TV News, and TV Crime Programs) are equal to the number of hours a week a respondent spends: (1) ‘‘looking at news stories on the internet’’; (2) ‘‘watching local television news’’; (3) ‘‘watching crime drama programs (like CSI, NCIS, Bones, Law and Order).’’ As in Sample 1, we use the natural log of these measures in the regression models.
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Sample 3 Participants Respondents in Sample 3 completed questionnaires as part of a national web-based survey, which was conducted in March 2013 with 926 adult (18 and older) US residents who were randomly selected from Survey Monkey’s Audience panel. This large volunteer online panel includes more than 400,000 active panelists who receive two incentives for participation: a donation in their name to charity, and entry into a weekly drawing for $100. Several recent studies have used data from this panel (see e.g., Bregman et al. 2015; Pickett et al. 2013). Prior research suggests that nonprobability Internet samples often allow for valid correlational inferences (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014; Bhutta 2012), and yield data with lower levels of social desirability bias and measurement error (Chang and Krosnick 2009; Kreuter et al. 2008). The participation rate (completions/total invitations sent) was 25 %.4
Measures In this sample, Perceived Victimization Risk is measured as a two-item index (r = .69) equal to the mean of responses (0–100) to the following two questions: An AGGRAVATED ASSAULT occurs when someone unlawfully attacks another person and either causes serious bodily harm or is armed with a dangerous weapon. What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will be the VICTIM of an AGGRAVATED ASSAULT during the next 12 months? A ROBBERY occurs when an individual uses force or the threat of force to take money or property directly from another person. What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will be the VICTIM of a ROBBERY during the next 12 months? The media variables (Internet News, National TV News, Local TV News, and TV Crime Programs) are measured as days of exposure, specifically, ‘‘In a typical WEEK, on how many days do you do each of the following: (1) Look at news and current events on the internet? (2) Watch national evening news like CNN? (3) Watch local television news? (4) Watch crime programs like COPS, CSI, and Law and Order?’’
Sample 4 Participants Sample 4 included individuals who were interviewed as part of the 2007–2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) (Jackman and Vavreck 2009).5 In the CCAP, twentyseven research teams collaborated to conduct a longitudinal Internet survey of registered US voters. YouGov/Polimetrix fielded the survey with members of its online panel in six waves between December 2007 and November 2008. YouGov/Polimetrix used a two-stage matching procedure to maximize the representativeness of samples drawn from its online 4
Scholars recommend reporting a participation rate in lieu of a response rate in research using volunteer web surveys (Baker et al. 2010).
5
Detailed information on the sampling procedure and attrition across waves is provided in (Jackman and Vavreck 2009).
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panel (Rivers and Bailey 2009), and extant research demonstrates the generalizability of findings from such samples (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014). All of the measures we use derive from the ‘‘Common Content’’ portion of release 2.1 of the CCAP. We include in the analysis all respondents for whom complete data on the measures used in this study are available. This yields a sample of 11,536 respondents. Individuals residing in battleground states and states with early primaries were oversampled in the survey. Thus we employ the provided sampling weights in the analyses to adjust for this overrepresentation.
Measures Favors Death Penalty is measured with the following question, which was asked in the CCAP’s October 2008 wave: ‘‘Do you favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?’’ The original response options ranged from 1 = favor strongly, to 4 = oppose strongly. We recoded responses to generate a binary measure coded ‘‘1’’ if the respondent favored the death penalty and ‘‘0’’ if he or she opposed it. For the respondents in Sample 4, news consumption is measured as days of exposure. For Internet News, in three waves (December, March, and September), respondents were asked, ‘‘IN THE LAST WEEK, how many days have you used the Internet to visit news websites (like MSNBC.com, Foxnews.com, NYTimes.com).’’ We used the responses in the three waves to create a mean index (a = .84) indicating the average number of days a week the respondent consumes Internet news. For Local TV News, in five waves (December, January, March, September, and October), respondents were asked: ‘‘was the local news a part of the programming you watched yesterday?’’ (0 = no, 1 = yes).6 We summed the responses to this question across the five waves to generate an index (a = .85) indicating the total number of times the respondent reported watching local TV news programming the previous day (0 = none, 5 = all five times).
Findings We begin by examining the relationships between exposure to television news and crime programs and criminal justice attitudes. This provides a set of results with which to compare subsequent findings for exposure to Internet news, and helps to ensure that the relationships observed in previous studies replicate for the four national samples examined here. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the models for Samples 1, 2 and 3 because the outcome variables in these models are functionally continuous. We use binary logistic regression for Sample 4, where the outcome variable is dichotomous. Models 1–17 in Table 1 present the results of separate regression models estimating the associations of each of the television media variables with public attitudes, net of the controls, for all four samples. Only one measure of media exposure is included in each model. In every case, regardless of the specific measure of television exposure, the coefficients are positive.7 Of the 17 separate 6
In each wave, this question followed a series of questions that asked about the TV stations the respondent watched the previous day.
7
Note that for model 11 in Table 1, which evaluates the effect of local news consumption on death penalty support for Sample 4, the sample size is 8517. This is because the local news measure is an additive index, and thus only respondents who were asked the respective question in each wave are included. This did not change the findings: if only the local news question from the baseline interview is used, the sample is 11,536, and the effect of local news consumption is unchanged (b = .349, p \ .001).
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–
National TV news (days)
–
Local TV news (days)
–
TV crime programs (days)
–
.002
–
.192**
–
.292***
–
.109
–
.002
–
.033
–
.123
–
.138*
–
-.175
–
.186
–
.314**
–
–
–
.036
–
.111
–
.272**
–
–
DV = perceived risk
.623*
.650**
.225
-.232
–
–
–
–
Sample 3 (N = 845) DV = perceived risk
-.106***
–
–
–
.117***
–
–
–
Sample 4 (N = 11,536)a DV = favors death penalty
a
The sample size for model 11 (Sample 4) in 8517 because only respondents who were asked the local news question in each data collection wave were included
p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001 (two-tailed significance test)
DV dependent variable
Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented. Estimates shown are from equations that include all additional control variables. The models for Samples 1–3 are estimated with ordinary least squares regression. The models for sample 4 are estimated with logistic regression
.007
–
Internet news (hours)
Internet news (days)
Models 18–24
Internet exposure
.014
TV crime programs (hours)
Models 12–17
.179
Local TV news (hours)
Models 5–11
.152
DV = punitive attitudes
DV = perceived risk
DV = police powers
DV = punitive attitudes
Sample 2 (N = 475)
Sample 1 (N = 942)
National TV news (hours)
Models 1–4
Television exposure
Models and variables
Table 1 Analyses of the effects of exposure to television and internet media on public attitudes about crime and justice
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coefficients, 12 (71 %) are significant or marginally significant. These findings are generally consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work, and suggest that television exposure is positively associated with anxiety about crime and support for ‘‘get tough’’ policies. For example, in Sample 1, the number of hours spent watching national television news is positively associated with support for expanding police powers, punitiveness, and perceived victimization risk. Likewise, Samples 1, 2, and 4 show that respondents who spend more time watching local television news tend to be more punitive. Does exposure to Internet news have a similar relationship with attitudes about crime and justice? Models 18–24 in Table 1 address this question. They show the comparable regression results for the Internet news consumption variables for the four samples. Note that the television consumption measures are not included in these models. Contrasting the results for television exposure, we find little consistent evidence that Internet news consumption is associated with views about crime and justice. Across the seven separate models, four coefficients are positive, three are negative, and only one is statistically significant. That relationship occurs in Sample 4, and indicates that Internet news exposure is negatively associated with support for the death penalty among the CCAP respondents. Taken together, the findings for the four samples suggest that Internet news consumption may differ from other forms of media exposure in terms of its relationship to public opinion about crime and justice. Perhaps the null findings of Internet news consumption observed in Table 1 are because exposure to Internet news has an impact on attitudes only among certain subgroups of respondents. This would be expected on the basis of the differential reception thesis, which predicts that media messages has dissimilar effects on persons depending on their backgrounds, experiences, and social environments. To examine this possibility we follow the practice used in previous studies and disaggregate our four samples on the basis of the other variables used in the analyses.8 We then separately estimate the associations of Internet news consumption, net of the controls, for each subsample of respondents. Table 2 shows the results for Sample 1. Specifically, it presents the coefficients for the relationship of Internet news consumption with the three dependent variables (Police Powers, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Victimization Risk) for each subsample of respondents. In total, 48 coefficients are presented, which derive from 48 separate regression models. Surprisingly, no statistically significant relationships emerge, nor is there any pattern in the direction of the coefficients that would suggest systematic differences in the relationship between Internet news consumption and attitudes across groups of respondents. The results of the disaggregated analyses for Sample 2 are reported in Table 3. Here there are 14 subsamples of respondents and two dependent variables—Punitive Attitudes and Perceived Victimization Risk. The 28 coefficients shown in the table derive from a series of regression models separately estimating the association between Internet news 8
Although research shows that factors such as age, education, and income are associated with the frequency of Internet use (Zickuhr and Smith 2012; Perrin and Duggan 2015), we disaggregate at the median for three reasons. First, the differential reception hypothesis predicts that group differences in media effects will exist not because of differences in frequency of use, but because group characteristics and group-specific experiences should moderate the effect of media consumption on attitudes (Chiricos et al. 1997, 2000). Second, as noted above, prior research provides inconsistent evidence about the groups for whom media consumption matters most (Eschholz 1997, 2003). Third, there is no existing theoretical scholarship that suggests a reason to split the sample at specific values, and thus we believe that any decision to dichotomize at specific ages, education levels, etc. would necessarily be arbitrary. Our decision to consistently dichotomize at the median across all samples avoids this arbitrariness.
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Table 2 Disaggregated analyses: estimates of the effects of exposure to internet news for subsamples of respondents (Sample 1) Subsample
N
Effect of internet news exposure (hours) DV = police powers
DV = punitive attitudes
DV = perceived victimization risk
Household victim
265
.051
.037
.205
No household victim
677
-.004
-.012
-.100 -.015
Male
417
-.059
-.101
Female
525
.080
.101
.011
Non-white
208
.126
.046
.101
White
734
-.034
-.008
-.015
Age B54
633
-.054
-.008
-.038
Age 55?
309
.133
.033
-.005
No college degree
596
-.067
-.002
-.056
College degree
346
.093
-.057
.110
Income B$74.9k
627
.040
-.002
-.080
Income $75k?
315
-.045
.024
.141
Liberal or moderate
551
-.083
-.075
-.095
Conservative
391
.148
.133
.116
Non-south
605
.011
-.075
-.036
South
337
-.030
.139
.022
Presented are unstandardized regression coefficients. Estimates shown are from equations that include all additional control variables. The subsamples for Age, Education, and Income are defined according to the median response category (i.e., at or below median versus above median) DV dependent variable
p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001 (two-tailed significance test)
consumption and these two outcome variables for each subsample of respondents. Only three marginally significant effects emerge. Greater exposure to Internet news is negatively associated with punitiveness among females, non-whites, and those who are politically liberal or moderate. It bears emphasizing, however, that given the number of models estimated, one would expect to identify some statistically significant relationships simply by chance. Thus, these three associations may not be indicative of genuine relationships. Table 4 presents the results of the disaggregated analyses for Sample 3. The reported coefficients derive from a series of regression models estimating the association between Internet exposure and perceived victimization risk for 22 different subsamples of respondents. An inspection of the table reveals that only one marginally significant relationship emerges. Exposure to Internet news is associated with lower perceived victimization risk among male respondents. Again, though, given the large number of regression models we estimated, it is possible that this relationship emerged simply by chance. Thus the most accurate conclusion from the data is that the findings for the online panelists in Sample 3 converge with those for Samples 1 and 2 in showing that exposure to Internet news is generally inconsequential for criminal justice attitudes, even when the focus is on specific subsamples of respondents.
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Table 3 Disaggregated analyses: estimates of the effect of exposure to internet news for subsamples of respondents (Sample 2) Subsample
N
Effect of internet news exposure (hours) DV = punitive attitudes
DV = perceived victimization risk
Male
210
-.053
Female
265
-.336
-.149
64
-.725
-.065
White
411
-.089
.028
Age B64
318
-.248
.035 -.040
Non-White
.193
Age 65?
157
-.046
No college degree
259
-.221
.028
College degree
216
-.087
.103 -.036
Income B$74.9k
323
-.076
Income $75k?
152
-.381
Liberal or moderate
246
-.345
.108 -.097
Conservative
229
.026
.181
Non-South
296
-.258
-.029
South
179
.008
.131
Presented are unstandardized regression coefficients. Estimates shown are from equations that include all additional control variables. The subsamples for Age, Education, and Income are defined according to the median response category (i.e., at or below median versus above median) for the respective variable DV dependent variable
p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001 (two-tailed significance test)
We provide one final test of the differential reception thesis with the data from Sample 4. Table 5 presents 18 coefficients for the association between Internet news consumption and the likelihood of favoring the death penalty for each of the 18 subsamples of respondents. Of the 18 coefficients, 17 are negative, and 16 are negative and statistically significant. Specifically, the data show that Internet news consumption reduces support for the death penalty among all but two of the subsamples of respondents: political conservatives and born again Christians. Interestingly, across the disaggregated analyses for all four samples (Tables 2, 3, 4, 5), among conservatives, all of the Internet news exposure coefficients are positive and non-significant. Meanwhile, among non-conservatives, all of the coefficients are negative, with two being significant or marginally significant. We tested the interaction formally by including product terms between the Internet News and Conservative measures in the full models predicting the seven outcome variables for the four samples. Five of the seven resulting coefficients, including that for Sample 4, were significant. This suggests a significant moderating effect of political ideology on the relationship between Internet news exposure and views about crime and justice.
Sensitivity Analyses In this section, we report the results from several sets of supplementary analyses that examine the sensitivity of the findings to alternative model specifications. As discussed above, there are substantial age differences in both the extent and nature of Internet usage,
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Subsample
229
N
Effect of internet news exposure (days) DV = perceived victimization risk
High concern
284
-.639
Low concern
561
-.061
High disorder
417
-.159
Low disorder
428
-.247
Household victim
239
.787
No household victim
606
-.539
Victim
154
-.128
Non-victim
691
-.190
Male
396
-.790
Female
449
.254
Non-white
109
–1.169
Presented are unstandardized regression coefficients. Estimates shown are from equations that include all additional control variables. The subsamples for Concern, Disorder, Age, Education, and Income are defined according to the median response category (i.e., at or below median versus above median)
Income [$100k
291
-.564
Liberal or moderate
597
-.492
DV dependent variable
Conservative
248
.503
Non-south
611
-.148
South
234
-.447
p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001 (twotailed significance test)
White
736
-.117
Age B53
456
-.500
Age [53
389
.186
No graduate degree
603
-.233
Graduate degree
242
-.147
Income B$100k
554
-.096
with young persons being the most active and proficient online (Perrin and Duggan 2015). We thus examined whether similar results emerged when we disaggregated the samples at two alternative cutting points (rather than at the median): (1) under versus over 25-yearsold, and (2) under versus over 35-years-old.9 The supplementary findings were consistent with the main results. In Samples 1, 2 and 3, we found no consistent evidence that Internet news consumption was related to criminal justice attitudes for any of the age groups.10 In Sample 4, Internet news consumption was significantly and negatively correlated with death penalty support for all of the age groups. Finally, because the models for Sample 4 were estimated using binary logistic regression, we examined whether the observed interaction between political ideology and Internet news exposure was simply an artifact of differences in residual variability across political groups. Specifically, in non-linear probability models apparent differences in 9
In Sample 2, we were unable to use the cutting point of under versus over 25-years-old, because there were too few respondents between the ages of 18 and 25 (N = 14) to estimate models separately for this group. Accordingly, for Sample 2, we only used the cutting point of under versus over 35-year-old in the supplementary models.
10 In Sample 2, for respondents under age 35, Internet news exposure was significantly and positively associated with perceived victimization risk (b = .641, p \ .05), but was not related to punitiveness. However, the relationship failed to replicate for the same age group—persons under age 35—in Samples 1 and 3, which also included measures of perceived victimization risk.
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Table 5 Disaggregated analyses: estimates of the effects of exposure to internet news for subsamples of respondents (Sample 4) Subsample
N
Effect of internet news exposure (days) DV = favors death penalty
Male
5959
-.099***
Female
5577
-.110***
Non-white
1949
-.104***
White
9587
-.106***
Age B51
5868
-.128***
Age [51
5668
-.077***
No college degree
7204
-.110***
College degree
4332
-.116***
Income B$69.9k
6803
-.116***
Income [$69.9k
4733
-.085***
Not born again
7765
-.141***
Born again
3771
-.023
Less than monthly rel. att.
6647
-.141***
Monthly religious att.
4889
-.056** -.147***
Liberal or moderate
6769
Conservative
4767
Non-south
7509
-.102***
South
4027
-.113***
.034
Presented are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients. Estimates shown are from equations that include all additional control variables. The subsamples for Age, Education, Income, and Religious attendance are defined according to the median response category (i.e., at or below median versus above median) DV dependent variable, rel. religious, att. attendance
p \ .10; * p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001 (two-tailed significance test)
regression coefficients across groups can occur simply because the residual variances differ across the groups (Williams 2009). Accordingly, we estimated a heterogeneous choice model including the Conservative variable in the variance equation (Williams 2009). The model revealed greater residual variability [ln(r) = 1.25, p = .009] among conservatives than among non-conservatives. However, even after adjusting for this difference in residual variation, a significant interaction (b = .231, p \ .001) emerged between political ideology and Internet news exposure in Sample 4. Exposure to Internet news was only negatively associated with death penalty support among respondents who did not self-identify as conservative.
Discussion and Conclusion Beginning with Gerbner and Gross (1976), researchers have explored the impact of media consumption on popular attitudes about crime and social control. Later work incorporated the differential reception thesis to account for systematic disparities in cultivation effects across audience members (Eschholz et al. 2003; Pickett et al. 2015; Weitzer and Kubrin 2004). The advent of the Internet, a growing presence in daily American life and an
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increasingly significant source of news and information, has generated important new questions about the relationship between the media and public opinion (Beale 2006; Melican and Dixon 2008). But despite its popularity, there have been few prior examinations of how Internet news consumption relates to views about crime and justice. To begin to fill this gap in the literature, the current study uses data from four national surveys to assess the relationships between Internet news exposure and perceived victimization risk, punitiveness, and support for expanding police powers. At the same time, we also investigate the associations between exposure to ‘‘traditional media’’—television news and crime drama programming—and criminal justice attitudes. Our analyses yield several notable findings. Below, we summarize these findings and discuss their implications. First, the results generally suggest that exposure to television news and crime programs is associated with greater anxiety about victimization and increased support for ‘‘get tough’’ crime policies. Although this finding largely replicates those of prior investigations (Chiricos et al. 2000; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Kort-Butler and Sittner Hartshorn 2011), it is nonetheless important. With only a few exceptions (e.g., Dowler 2003; Gerbner and Gross 1976), previous studies examining the cultivation effects of traditional media on criminal justice attitudes have analyzed data from state or local surveys. Similar associations were observed across the four national samples analyzed in this study. This contributes to confidence that the relationships identified in prior research generalize to Americans more broadly. Still, the most important finding of our study is that the results provide no evidence that Internet news consumption is positively associated with anxiety about crime, or support for getting tough with criminals. Indeed, even when we disaggregate the samples to investigate differential relationships by audience traits, very few significant relationships emerge. Those that do are negative, the opposite direction of what would be expected on the basis of cultivation theory. Specifically, of the 116 different coefficients in the disaggregated analyses for the four samples of respondents, 79 (68 %) were negative, and 22 (19 %) were negative and at least marginally statistically significant. None of these 116 coefficients were both positive and statistically significant. Beyond this general pattern, two other findings bear mention. First, in Sample 4, the association between Internet news consumption and support for the death penalty is consistently negative and significant for the full sample and for most subsamples. This is not the case in the other three samples, and may reflect the fact that when compared to those samples, Sample 4 is (1) much larger, (2) uses a multiple-item index to measure Internet consumption, and (3) focuses only on views about the death penalty, which is an especially punitive crime policy. Second, across all four of our samples, when we specifically examine conservative respondents, the associations between Internet news exposure and the dependent variables are always positive, despite being non-significant. Meanwhile, the relationships for nonconservatives are always negative, with two relationships being significant or marginally significant. This is the only consistent audience pattern to emerge from our analyses, and it provides little support for the current four versions of the differential reception thesis—the resonance, substitution, vulnerability, and affinity hypotheses. Thus, our results tentatively suggest the need for an alternative version of the differential reception thesis in the context of Internet news consumption. This ‘‘ideology hypothesis’’ suggests that political ideology may be the primary audience trait that moderates the relationship between Internet news and attitudes. Future studies should further examine this prediction and explore how individuals’ political beliefs may influence their choice of news websites, their selection of content on those sites, and their reception and retention of criminal justice information from that content.
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When taken together, the evidence in our study indicates that Internet news consumption either is not related to public views about crime and justice or, among certain groups of individuals, actually is negatively related to perceived victimization risk and punitiveness. The key theoretical implication is that cultivation theory is not supported in the context of Internet news exposure. This suggests a need for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between media consumption and crime and justice attitudes and, in particular, new research that addresses the question of why the Internet may be related to the public’s opinions on crime and justice in different ways than traditional media outlets. One potential explanation is that the Internet, unlike traditional media sources, can simultaneously provide news reports as well as easy access to an array of other websites, which may include more in-depth accounts, or even conflicting perspectives (Britto and Noga-Styron 2014). Some scholars, for example, theorize that traditional media sources induce anxieties about crime because they condense criminal justice incidents into short stories that are both decontextualized and frequently racially biased (Dixon and Linz 2000b; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). By contrast, the Internet news consumer has the option to immediately dig deeper, gather background information, hear the story from multiple angles, and to check government websites, as well as user-generated content (e.g. blogs, comments sections, and social networking sites) (Beale 2006; Kim 2008). This of course assumes that Internet news consumers have a strong commitment to learning about crime and criminal justice issues. This assumption may be fundamentally outdated. Television media traditionally sensationalizes crime news in a bid to attract viewers (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Yet set against mundane daily news, crime stories are striking. They draw the attention of the passive television consumer. In contrast to television, Internet consumption involves higher levels of user agency and choice, as well as more active engagement (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012). The Internet’s size, variety, and unrestricted stew of news and entertainment (e.g., clips of Comedy Central’s The Daily Show) may therefore minimize the garish appeal of crime news, limiting its power to influence views and attitudes.11 If this is found to be the case in future studies, the implication would be that when given the ability to choose, individuals may prefer other types of news (e.g. entertainment news) to stories about crime and violence. In short, it may be that crime and justice news is simply far from the most tantalizing meal on the menu of digital content. If this is in fact the case, then as citizens increasingly shift to consuming news via the Internet, they may be exposed (by choice) to proportionally less criminal justice content. The impact on overall levels of perceived risk and punitiveness among citizens could be substantial, since traditional news has been a key shaper of public opinion on criminal justice in the United States (Beckett 1997). Alternatively, it may be that the nature of Internet news consumption, relative to traditional media use, involves different cues for story importance and strategies for organizing information. This may be less conducive to the retention and precise recall of crime stories (see Althaus and Tewksbury 2002; Eveland et al. 2004). It is also possible that for crime news specifically, members of the public may be especially skeptical about the credibility of Internet information sources. Although, it bears noting that for general news, the extant evidence is mixed about whether Internet sources are viewed as being more or less credible than traditional media (Flanagin and Metzger 2000; Johnson and Kaye 2010).
11 Another possibility is that individuals using the Internet to obtain news content may seek out information that corresponds with their pre-existing attitudes, and thus that has minimal impact on those beliefs.
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A principal limitation of our study is that none of our measures asked specifically about the consumption of Internet crime news. Rather, the measures tapped time spent viewing online news content, irrespective of topic. It is possible that the null findings for Internet news exposure observed may be a reflection of that fact. Importantly, though, our measures of exposure to national and local television news also did not ask specifically about consumption of crime news, and yet they were still positively related to anxieties about crime and support for getting tough with criminals. It bears noting that we used broad measures of media consumption to be consistent with, and increase the comparability of the findings to, prior studies in this area (Chiricos et al. 1997, 2000; Kort-Butler and Sittner Hartshorn 2011). Nevertheless, there is likely a great deal of heterogeneity in Internet use. Given the strong likelihood of nuanced mechanisms of Internet news consumption, we nominate as a priority for future research the assessment of the relationship between more nuanced measures of Internet news exposure (e.g., the frequency of sharing or commenting on crime stories) and public attitudes toward crime and justice. For example, social networking websites like Facebook are now used by approximately 50 % of all adults in the US, and by more than 80 % of adult Internet users who are under the age of 30 (Madden and Zickuhr 2011). These platforms allow people to not only receive, but also create, spin, and transmit ‘‘news’’ (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012). It is plausible that such web activity may serve salient, but as yet unidentified, functions in the social construction of popular ideas about key social issues such as crime and punishment. Another limitation of our study is that, similar to virtually all studies of criminal justice attitudes (Eschholz et al. 2003; Weitzer and Kubrin 2004), it is cross-sectional. Thus, our models are only able to examine associations between variables, and not the causal effects of one variable on another. It does bear noting that, to our knowledge, there is very little evidence that either perceived victimization risk or attitudes toward crime control affect news consumption via traditional media or the Internet. For example, Van den Bulck (2004) tested the cultivation model (media consumption affecting fear of crime) against the reverse causation model (fear of crime affecting media consumption) and found support for the cultivation model, but not for the reverse causation model. Nonetheless, there is a need for future research to explore if perceived victimization and attitudes about crime control shape Internet news consumption. To conclude, the current study provides evidence that among members of general public, new media differs from traditional media in its relationship to public views about crime and justice. We show that Internet news consumption either is not related to, or in some cases is actually negatively related to, anxieties about crime and support for harsh crime policies. These results raise questions about whether cultivation theory and the differential reception thesis are useful theoretical frameworks for understanding how the rapidly expanding sources of news on the Internet may influence public opinion. It is important, however, for future studies to extend our work using alternative measures of Internet usage and, ideally, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches (see Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2010). This is especially true given that the Internet is a highly dynamic medium. The extent of its usage, its content, and the different ways to access that content, will no doubt continue to grow, generating new questions both about media effects and mass-mediated interactions (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012). Acknowledgments This work was supported by funding from the University at Albany, SUNY’s Faculty Research Award Program (FRAP)—Categories A and B. The authors thank Shawn Bushway for his help with collecting data for one of the samples, and Kate Hart for her comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. An earlier draft of the manuscript was presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the American
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Society of Criminology in Atlanta, GA. The data from the four samples have been used previously by the authors, either in published or unpublished research, to test other hypotheses.
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