REVIEW ESSAY Two Cultures After All? One Nation, Two Cultures. B y G e r t r u d e Himmelfarb. N e w York:Alfred A. Knopf. 1999. xii + 179 pp., cloth, $23.00.

R e v i e w e d by Alan Woolfolk T h e first c h a p t e r of G e r t r u d e Himmelfarb's One Nation, Two Cultures opens with a revealing quotation from Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations d e s c r i b i n g the "two different schemes or systems of morality" that Smith contended prevail in all civilized societies:"In every civilized society, in every society w h e r e the distinction of ranks has once b e e n completely established, there have b e e n always two different schemes or systems of morality c u r r e n t at the same t i m e ; o f w h i c h the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loose system.The former is generally admired and revered by the c o m m o n people; the latter is c o m m o n l y more esteemed and a d o p t e d by what are called people of fashion." Himmelfarb's reference to Smith is r e v e a l i n g for t w o r e a s o n s . First, it makes clear the theoretical assumption held by Hinamelfarb, as well as by many other analysts of the American culture w a r in recent years, that our culture is best u n d e r s t o o d as comprised of two separate and c o m p e t i n g systems of morality. Second, Himmelfarb's citation of Smith signals that she intends to defend a "strict or austere" system of morality against a "liberal" or "loose" system of morality. Indeed, Himmelfarb makes no pretense of scholarly neutrality; for she assumes that the scholar can only bring dead facts to life if he or she is animated by passionate convictions and guided b y an intellectually compelling and c o h e r e n t vision of the way things are and ought to be. Himmelfarb certainly does n o t lack convictions. This latest work is ani-

mated by a moral seriousness about the diseases of c o n t e m p o r a r y American life that must be respected by anyone w h o has n o t yet b e c o m e a walking s y m p t o m of the prevailing moral indifference. But it is not at all clear that Himmelfarb's vision is informed by a sufficiently c o m p l e x and subtle u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the way things are and ought to be. Her spirited defense of a strict morality strains against her intellectual analysis to the d e t r i m e n t of b o t h , w i t h t h e analysis too frequently serving pedagogical purposes.

Himmelfarb's Sociological Imagination W i t h i n c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology, Himmelfarb's analysis most obviously draws from the work of James Davison Hunter and challenges the conclusions of Alan Wolfe in One Nation, AfterAll (1998). In particular, Himmelfarb relies u p o n Hunter's argument developed in

Culture Wars."The Struggle to Define America (1991) and elsewhere that c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n c u l t u r e is riven by two distinct and c o m p e t i n g moral v i s i o n s - - o n e "orthodox," the other "progressivist"--which cut across other potential lines of cleavage, such as socioeconomic class and religious affiliation, and w h i c h c a n n o t be reduced to political conflicts.The o r t h o d o x and progressivist motives b e h i n d such visions "provide the foundations n o t only for c o m p e t i n g moral visions ... but for c o m p e t i n g dogmas" According to Hunter,"what both sides bring to this public debate is, at least consciously, non-negotiable. What is ultimately at issue, then, are n o t just

disagreements about 'values' or 'opinions'.... What is ultimately at issue are deeply rooted and fundamentally different u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of b e i n g a n d purpose." H e n c e , o u r i n t e r m i n a b l e public conflicts over definitions of the family, abortion, homosexuality, public education, c e n s o r s h i p of the arts, the relationship b e t w e e n church and state, and a host of other issues. Aligned o n the orthodox side of this cultural divide are m a n y evangelical and fundamentalist Christians, Conservative and O r t h o d o x Jews, conservative Catholics, Mormons, and neo-conservative intellectuals.Aligned o n the progressivist side are many mainline Protestants, liberal Catholics, and Reform Jews, as well as the religiously indifferent a n d the vast majority of influential intellectuals and the professoriate A l t h o u g h these generalizations lack a certain precision, they seem to d e s c r i b e p a t t e r n s of moral c o n f l i c t more accurately than explanations that e m p h a s i z e the u p p e r - m i d d l e class b a c k g r o u n d of the progressivists and the lower-middle class and workingclass b a c k g r o u n d s of the orthodox, even t h o u g h such characterizations are not without merit (as Kristin Luker has argued with respect to the issue of abortion, for example). Himmelfarb writes tmapologetically in defense of Hunter's o r t h o d o x type, c o n t e n d i n g that the enthusiastic embrace of a loose system of morality by large n u m b e r s of Americans in r e c e n t decades has transformed a o n c e dissident, m i n o r i t y (read b o h e m i a n ) culture, w h i c h w a s h i s t o r i c a l l y m u c h more evident in Europe than the United States, into the dominantAmerican culture. Here, Himmeffarb develops a familiar and n o t u n c o n v i n c i n g line of a r g u m e n t to the effect that during the 1960sTrilling's "adversary culture" of artists and writers was democratized into Roszak's "counterculture" and beyond, as deviancy was repeatedly defmed"downward" with the cons e q u e n c e that entire categories of deviance simply ceased to exist u n d e r the transformed standards of the d o m i n a n t culture. H o w e v e r theoretically simplistic and one-sided Himmelfarb's analysis of REVIEW ESSAY

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this cultural r e v o l u t i o n may be, h e r c o n t e n t i o n that this revolution constituted a moral decline w h i c h became manifest in the "moral statistics" of 1960s a n d s u c c e s s i v e d e c a d e s - - a s seen in spiraling m u r d e r rates (suicide r e m a i n s o d d l y u n m e n t i o n e d ) ; increased teenage sexual promiscuity, out-of-wedlock births, and child abuse; rising alcohol and drug abuse;welfare d e p e n d e n c y ; e t c . - - r a i s e s disturbing q u e s t i o n s that few social scientists have honestly confronted. By pointing to such inconvenient facts, Himmelfarb aims, in effect, to expand "the sociological imagination" in unconventional directions. Like Mills, Himmelfarb aspires to i m p r o v e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ourselves and others by placing individuals w i t h i n their socio-historical context, by linking individual biography with collective history."The sociological imagination," Mills w r o t e in The Sociological Imagination (1959),"enables its possessor to u n d e r s t a n d the larger historical scene in terms of its m e a n i n g for the i n n e r life and the external career of a variety of individuals?' But where Mills sought at the dawn of the 1960s to e m p o w e r the individual for public responsibility and action by i n t e r p r e t i n g m a n y of the personal troubles of the individual's immediate milieu in terms of"the public issues of the social structure," Himmelfarb seeks to r e n e w moral constraints u p o n individuals b y showing us the m o r a l p r i c e of o u r v a r i o u s remissive liberations and the inadequacies of our current sociological imagination for addressing these problems. This is n o t to say that Himmelfarb is o p p o s e d to the cultivation of responsible p u b l i c actors; to the contrary, m u c h of her analysis aims at clarifying h o w a more vibrant ideal of citizenship might be encouraged with a correction of the sociological imagination. But she writes after having absorbed what she believes are the lessons of t h e last h a l f - c e n t u r y . A c c o r d i n g l y , Himmelfarb argues in favor of a politics of civic virtues rather than a politics of protest, cultural controls rather t h a n releases, a n d p e r s o n a l self-restraint rather than self-expression. 84

Himmelfarb's sociological imagination may b e fruitfully contrasted with that of William Julius Wilson, w h o has also a t t e m p t e d to come to grips with the role of cultural influences in bringing about our epidemic of moral ills, especially a m o n g the so-called u r b a n "underclass." In When Work Disappears: The World o f the N e w Urban Poor (1996), for example, Wilson ack n o w l e d g e s that the w e a k e n i n g of normative controls on sexual activity and in s u p p o r t of husband-wife families in the larger society has contribu t e d to the plight of the inner-city poor. ButWilson c o n t e n d s that it is the "interaction" of these debilitating"cultural constraints" a n d e c o n o m i c marginality that is devastating for the inner-city family."The weaker the n o r m s against premarital sex, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, and nonmarital parenthood, the more that e c o n o m i c considerations affect decisions to marry."For Wilson, however, the "structural constraints" are what prove to be decisive. In addition to e c o n o m i c barriers and discrimination (both racial and class), disorganized c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h collapsing social institutions and declining social s u p p o r t for a strict system of morality encourage "adaptive" attitudes and behaviors that are "ghettorelated" (as o p p o s e d to "ghetto-spec i f i c " ) a n d , to say t h e l e a s t , self-defeating for the poor. In o t h e r words, structural constraints, broadly conceived, shape patterns of socialization for the worse and press otherwise upright citizens toward moral compromises. What's more, according to Wilson, the prevailingAmerican belief that individuals are largely r e s p o n s i b l e for their economic situations adds another "cultural constraint" that works against the r e c o g n i t i o n and amelioration of the effects of structural constraints. According to the d o m i n a n t belief system,"the moral fabric o f individuals, not the social and economic structure o f society, ... is the root o f the problem." In an ironic twist,Wilson's analysis highlights h o w a strict system of morality--or, perhaps more accurately, the pretense of a strict s y s t e m - - w h i c h attributes moral responsibility to indi-

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viduals for their fates, works against the very possibility of cultivating moral integrity. From Wilson's perspective, our impoverished sociological imagination defines the p r i m a r y failure of American culture.A change in the consciousness of society must precede the reform of the social a n d e c o n o m i c structures.Thus, a final irony: in order to break the hold of s o c i o e c o n o m i c constraints that shape ghetto-related behavior, W i l s o n has a t t e m p t e d to clarify an ethic of responsibility that w o u l d remove the cultural blinders of the mainstream society, t h e r e b y conc e d i n g the priority of cultural over s o c i o e c o n o m i c structures.

Remissive Damage Control Himmelfarb clearly has her d o u b t s a b o u t any ethic of responsibility that u n d e r e s t i m a t e s the i m p o r t a n c e of a morality of constraint and looks to soc i o e c o n o m i c reforms as the r e m e d y for our moral ills, especially if such reforms are to be initiated by the central government. On the other hand, Himmelfarb is also critical of theorists, such as Charles Murray, w h o w o u l d dismiss the role of g o v e r n m e n t altogether and risk "attenuating the idea o f c i t i z e n s h i p . " She o p p o s e s t h e delegitimization of the state precisely b e c a u s e w e are, as A r i s t o t l e , Tocqueville, andArendt have taught us, not merely social but political animals. Himmelfarb operates from the assumption that identification w i t h the polity is necessary to our spiritual and moral health. Active citizenship makes the individual whole. But the state can help to remedy the diseases of democratic society only insofar as it aids the c u l t i v a t i o n of m a n n e r s a n d morals. Political policies are never"value neutral." Himmelfarb c o n t e n d s that the legislation of morality n e e d n o t be a puritanical farce. Rather, good g o v e r n m e n t m u s t necessarily e n c o u r a g e attitude changes that favor a strong work ethic and personal responsibility. Although u n c o n v i n c i n g , Himmelfarb p o i n t s to recent welfare reform and lower crime rates as e v i d e n c e that p o l i t i c s c a n shape culture. It is o n e of the great merits of One Nation, Two Cultures that Himmelfarb

does not shrink from demonstrating the theoretical and practical failings of apolitical ethics of responsibility, especially those w h i c h invoke two godterms popular among combatants in our contemporary kulturkampf-"civil society" and "the family." Civil society, Himmelfarb argues, has a long history as a c o n c e p t in the writings of Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Ferguson, and Burke, but it was only in the work of Hegel andTocqueville that it received clear expositions, and it is only recently that the ideal of civil society has b e e n widely invoked in response to democratic moral and cultural disorders."It is an attractive ideal" Himmelfarb observes, following the arguments of the classical liberals,"because it calls u p o n n o t h i n g more than such natural, familiar, universal institutions as families and communities." It is also attractive, she argues, as "an attribute of democracy o n the largest scale--TocqueviUe's'voluntary associations'"--which were e n v i s i o n e d by him as mediating bet w e e n the individual and the state and as a corrective to "the tyranny of the majority." But, Himmeifarb continues, to conceive of the contemporary institutions of civil society as "the seedbeds of virtue" is a vain hope. In recent years, the inspirational myth of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe has become a casualty of the liberation from C o m m u n i s m . "We are w i t n e s s e s , " Vhclav Havel wrote in 1992, "to a bizarre state of affairs: society has freed itself, true, but in some ways it behaves worse than w h e n it was in chains." Likewise, Himmelfarb c o n t e n d s , the institutions of American civil society c a n n o t i n o c u l a t e Americans against the moral and cultural diseases of the day b e c a u s e they are too often rife w i t h the very s y m p t o m s that they might otherwise prevent. And at the very least, the same democratic virus infects them. The restoration of civil society is simply "not enough." What exactly is the nature of this d e m o c r a t i c virus? O n this c e n t r a l count, Himmelfarb's answer is less than illuminating:"the ethical and cultural relativism that reduces all values, standards, and institutions to expressions

of personal will and power." Himmelfarb's formulation reads like popularized Nietzsche or a variation of w h a t Alasdair MacIntyre calls the d o c t r i n e of emotivism. But w h e r e a s Maclntyre has attempted to c o u n t e r emotivism b y articulating a neo-Aristotelian theory of virtues that elaborates in considerable detail the pivotal c o n c e p t s of a moral tradition, a life narrative, and practices, Himmelfarb too frequently writes as if she actually believes that if we w o u l d simply reaffirm certain basic moral principles, our moral d i l e m m a s w o u l d be resolved and diseases cured. More to the point, Himmelfarb offers at best an incomplete intellectual defense of her o w n moral positions in favor of cultural orthodoxy. Consequently, she leaves herself o p e n to the challenge that her own moral claims are n o t h i n g more t h a n personal preferences, wants, and desires. I n t h e c a s e of the f a m i l y , Himmelfarb presents a by n o w familiar (see the work of Richard Gill, for i n s t a n c e ) but c o m p e l l i n g case conc e r n i n g its "perilous state," tracing its decline to the subversion of a bourgeois ethos that once valued self-denial and favored largely "involuntary" families defined by ties of blood, marriage, and adoption. Although m a n y social scientists routinely ignore the evidence, w e n o w k n o w with a fair degree of c e r t a i n t y that there have b e e n significant costs associated with this decline. Rising rates of divorce, single p a r e n t h o o d , o u t - o f - w e d l o c k births, and cohabitation have resulted in a host of social pathologies, ranging from exceptionally high poverty rates a m o n g female-headed households to significantly higher rates of incarceration among males raised in such households and m u c h more frequent abuse of w o m e n in n o n m a r i t a l as o p p o s e d to marital relationships. W h e t h e r the t o p i c is c h i l d a b u s e , e d u c a t i o n a l achievement, or long-term health, the traditional two-parent, biological family appears b y any sensible measure to be superior to "alternative" forms of family life. Nonetheless, Himmelfarb may dismiss n o n t r a d i t i o n a l families and, by

i m p l i c a t i o n , o t h e r r e m i s s i v e social forms too g l i b l y - - f o r m a n y "alternative" family forms may f u n c t i o n to limit and control the pathologies associated w i t h the e n d of the bourgeois ethos a n d the rise of a p r e s e n t - o r i e n t e d , therapeutic culture, while also accepting the basic remissive premise of that culture. W i t h o u t various "families of choice7 therapeutic groups such as CoD e p e n d e n t s A n o n y m o u s and, most recently,"civil unions," social pathologies might be worse than they currently are. I n d e e d , H i m m e l f a r b p r e s e n t s p l e n t y of e v i d e n c e that suggests as much. During the 1990s, for example, overall rates of out-of-wedlock births, teenage sexual activity (among fifteento nineteen-year-old females), divorce, abortion, drug use, HIV infection, a n d homicide in the United States s h o w e d signs of decline .Are such declines primarily the result of a renewal of a strict system of morality? Or, alternatively, has the d o m i n a n t liberal system of morality merely reformed itself in order to control some of its worst excesses? T h e basic r e m i s s i v e p r e m i s e of therapeutic culture is that all personal and social p r o b l e m s ultimately result from the cultural and social repression of the self. Consequently, according to the logic of what John Steadman Rice calls this "revolutionary discourse of l i b e r a t i o n psychotherapy," a release from inhibiting cultural controls and i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms is the s e c r e t to achieving personal well-being and curing our social pathologies. But individual a u t o n o m y is n o t viable; we are n o t free agents.As h u m a n beings b o r n into particular c o m m u n i t i e s , w e are deeply d e p e n d e n t u p o n symbolic and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s to b e c o m e functionally complete, let alone selfconscious individuals.The anticultural and anti-institutionalimpulses of therapeutic culture have i n d e e d had disastrous consequences. But this same culture has also created, in the words of Rice, "discourses of reform" in order to limit its worst excesses and exercise a remissive form of damage control.According to Rice, the co-dependency m o v e m e n t has appealed to large n u m b e r s of c o n t e m p o r a r y Americans REVIEW ESSAY

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precisely because it b o t h accepts the anticultural and anti-institutionalthrust of therapeutic culture a n d offers a way to stabilize social relationships a n d make n e w c o m m u n a l commitments. "Co-dependency offers a way to institutionalize liberation psychotherapy, to translate that symbolic system into a c o r r e s p o n d i n g system of social relations, into n e w forms of identity, family, faith, and community." Likewise, "families of choice" and an ever-increasing range of therapeutic social forms may serve to alleviate the worst symptoms of our therapeutic diseases. Alleviation, h o w e v e r , is n o t t h e same as healing.At best, mitigation is a temporary remedy; at worst, it is simply a t h e r a p e u t i c i l l u s i o n . C o n s e quently, Himmelfarb is right to be suspicious of remissive social forms such as "families of choice." But w i t h o u t a more penetrating analysis of the intric a c i e s of t h e r a p e u t i c c u l t u r e , Himmelfarb cannot m o u n t the defense of a "strict or austere" system of morality to w h i c h she aspires.

One Remissive Culture, After All Himmelfarb's analysis of contemporary American culture is based u p o n the c o n t e n t i o n that it is comprised of two separate and c o m p e t i n g systems of morality--that is, of"two cultures?' Although she does acknowledge toward the e n d of her study that these two cultures are not "totally separate and distinct," Himmelfarb's defense of a "dissident culture" of strict morality against the dominant remissive culture of loose morality takes for granted that the dissident culture has a moral integrity which has preserved and protected it in the face of the d o m i n a n t therapeutic culture .This appears to be a dubious assumption: Hirnmelfarb fails to consider the possibility that therapeutic culture has t r i u m p h e d m u c h more completely than she has imagined. Wolfe, for instance, finds little evidence for the existence of a culture war b e t w e e n Hunter's orthodox and progressivists."I have found little support,"Wolfe concludes,"for the n o t i o n that middle-class Americans are engaged in bitter culture conflict with

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each other over the proper way to live." A m e r i c a n s are u n i t e d precisely because they are "accommodating, pluralistic, tolerant, and expansive."Americans are reluctant to pass judgment, they are tolerant to a fault .... Above all moderate in their outlook on the world, they believe in the i m p o r t a n c e of leading a virtuous life but are reluctant to impose values they u n d e r s t a n d as virtuous for themselves on others; strong believers in morality, they do n o t want to be considered moralists." Yet, Himmelfarb c o u n t e r s that Wolfe obscures the polarization of contemporary American culture. Indeed, Himmelfarb suggests thatWolfe's o w n i n t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d absolutist judgm e n t s is itself symptomatic of his adh e r e n c e to the d o m i n a n t remissive system of morality. While Wolfe's analysis is dismissed by Himmelfarb, Hunter's work is decisive for h e r case b e c a u s e she cites H u n t e r at critical m o m e n t s in her arg u m e n t and, more important, his work provides the theoretical backdrop for her o w n . W i t h Hunter, Himmelfarb assumes, for apparently good reasons, that she is o n firm t h e o r e t i c a l a n d empirical g r o u n d in s u p p o r t of her two-culture thesis. After all, as o n e of the most p r o m i n e n t theorists of the A m e r i c a n k u l t u r k a m p f , H u n t e r has w r i t t e n extensively o n the cultural conflicts of the late-twentieth century. But Himmelfarb overlooks the persistent suggestion in Hunter's work that cultural c o n s e r v a t i v e s have u n w i t tingly accommodated to the d o m i n a n t therapeutic ethos. As early as American Evangelicalism:Conservative Religion a n d the Q u a n d a r y o f Modernity (1983), H u n t e r c o n t e n d e d that American evangelicalism had accepted the prevailing cultural p r e o c c u p a t i o n with psychological well-being and individual subjectivity to the detriment of an earlier, hard-edged Protestant asceticism. In Evangelicalism:The Coming Generation (1987), Htmter argued, taking a page from Philip Rieff, that conservative Protestantism had succ u m b e d to the larger " i m p o v e r i s h ment" of Western culture and could no longer be considered a source of"binding address." Hunter did n o t find sec-

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tarian incivility to be "a sign of its vitality n o r ... a sign that they are more c o m m i t t e d to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of truth." Rather, he found sectarian defensiveness to be symptomatic of "an underlying u n c e r t a i n t y about the fate and resilience of the beliefs they espouse." In Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture War (1994), H u n t e r e x t e n d e d his thesis o n c e again, arguing thatAmericans in both the progressivist and o r t h o d o x camps had fallen into an emotivist language to justify moral commitments. Contrasting a "language of sentiment" and p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e w i t h a "language of conviction," H u n t e r p o i n t e d to the noticeable a b s e n c e of a language of conviction in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n public life. Assuming that a language of conviction depended upon personal knowledge of what MacIntyre called a moral tradition, H u n t e r wrote:" Witho u t a base o f k n o w l e d g e a b o u t the law, w i t h o u t traditions o f m o r a l understanding to d r a w upon, a n d without cohesive moral communities w i t h i n whose values, norms, a n d ideals o u r lives are p a t t e r n e d , all w e have left are o u r emotions." Reliance u p o n s e n t i m e n t contributed to a public c o n d i t i o n that H u n t e r called" shallow democracy." In our shallow democracy, p u b l i c r h e t o r i c bec o m e s an exercise in m a n i p u l a t i o n ( w h i c h MacIntyre i d e n t i f i e d as the social hallmark of emotivism) domin a t e d b y s o u n d bites, slogans, a n d other assorted propaganda techniques, rather than thoughtful discussion and debate. With respect to the a b o r t i o n controversy, in particular, vested economic, sexual, and political interests o n b o t h sides are left u n e x a m i n e d in the rush "to gain the moral high ground." In addition, H u n t e r f o u n d w i d e s p r e a d legal illiteracy c o n c e r n i n g cases such as R o e v. Wade, c o n s i d e r a b l e m o r a l ambivalence and confusion among the general public, and a massive failure of civil institutions, such as the press a n d c h u r c h e s , to r i s e a b o v e t h e struggle for political power. In short, Hunter c o n d e m n e d the moral laxity of both the o r t h o d o x and progressivist camps while also arguing that w e are

a house divided into two hostile, selfrighteous moral camps. Perhaps unintentionally, H u n t e r threatened to und e r m i n e his o w n thesis that we are in t h e m i d s t of a n i n t r a n s i g e n t k u l t u r k a m p f by reducing both sides to mere political camps wielding moral slogans for their o w n gain. More significantly, he demonstrated that both c a m p s share the a s s u m p t i o n s of emotivism and, therefore, do speak, to a great extent, a c o m m o n albeit impoverished moral language. Hunter has followed the trajectory of this line of analysis m u c h farther in his most recent work The Death o f Character:Moral Education in a n Age W i t h o u t Good or Evil (2000). Published after One Nation, Two Cultures, this book explodes the two-culture thesis of Hunter's Culture Wars, proclaiming the decisive t r i u m p h of the therapeutic in the twentieth century. In the latter study, Hunter, following the example of Robert W u t h n o w in The R e s t r u c t u r i n g o f A m e r i c a n Rel# g i o n (1988), focused o n the institutional veneer and public discourse of American culture. By emphasizing the public moral divisions b e t w e e n us, however, Hunter slighted the transform a t i o n o f o u r i n n e r lives. Like Wuthnow, he identified the patterns of our external conflicts and took them to be indicative of deeper truths. But truth does not have deep and indelible personal qualities in a therapeutic culture. No creed, no symbolic of m i l i t a n t t r u t h s , is i n s t i l l e d d e e p l y e n o u g h in the self to establish what used to be called character. Consequently, public postures and symbolic battles appear to possess a profundity and r e s e m b l a n c e to earlier creedal fanaticisms that all too often is lacking. In Culture Wars, H u n t e r gave the reader good reason to conclude that the orthodox were losing to the progressivists in public conflicts over the family, public and higher education, media and the arts, and the law. "The institutional resources and p o w e r behind the progressivist vision," Hunter concluded,"are at least as strong and p r o b a b l y m u c h stronger than those favoring the orthodox." In addition,

Hunter p o i n t e d to a"plausible denouement" of culture conflicts as the orthodox slowly and unconsciously accommodated to the d o m i n a n t progressivist worldview. In The Therapeutic State." J u s t i f y i n g G o v e r n m e n t a t Century's E n d (1998), H u n t e r prot6g6 James Nolan, Jr. has added scholarly weight to this case by clarifying the extent to w h i c h the therapeutic ethos has penetrated the institutions of the state and, b e y o n d that, the hearts and m i n d s of those w h o m one might expect to be most opposed to any such victory.With respect to the state, Nolan p r e s e n t s c o m p e l l i n g evidence that the therapeutic ethos has made dramatic gains in civil law, c r i m i n a l justice, p u b l i c education, welfare policy, and political rhetoric in recent decades. From welfare reform to the self-esteem movem e n t in education, Nolan attempts to demonstrate that moral conservatives and moral liberals alike have accepted the centrality of the self and the criterion of personal well-being as definitive moral categories.

Himmelfarb credits religious and other cultural conservatives with initiating a genuine moral revival. H u n t e r a n d N o l a n raise s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e c a p a c i t y of H i m m e l f a r b ' s d i s s i d e n t c u l t u r e to mitigate, let a l o n e cure, the moral diseases of a democracy turned therapeutic.To suggest that the proliferation of religious television stations or the high p e r c e n t a g e of A m e r i c a n s w h o claim to a t t e n d c h u r c h regularly is e v i d e n c e that w e are i n the midst of an o n g o i n g religious revival c o m p a rable to the Great Awakening of the 1730s, as Himmelfarb does, begs too many obvious questions. It is true that H i m m e l f a r b does a c k n o w l e d g e that such statistics are "no l o n g e r reliable i n d i c a t o r s of moral a n d cultural dispositions." But this a c k n o w l e d g m e n t is a i m e d at criticizing the therapeutic religiosity of progressivists. In contrast, Himmelfarb credits religious a n d

other cultural conservatives w i t h initiating a g e n u i n e moral revival similar to the Wesleyan m o v e m e n t , suggesting that they have fostered significant individual and c o m m u n a l resistances to the r e g n a n t therapeutic culture. Indeed, there is a persuasive b u t limited case to be made for the role of religion in c o m b a t i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y social p a t h o l o g i e s . As H i m m e l f a r b p o i n t s out, various "faith-based prog r a m s ' h a v e b e g u n to accrue a record of success, for i n s t a n c e , in r e d u c i n g c r i m e a n d recidivism that c a n n o t b e ignored. N o n e t h e l e s s , in The D e a t h o f C h a r a c t e r H u n t e r finds little evid e n c e that c o n t e m p o r a r y c o m m u n i ties of faith a n d a n t i p r o g r e s s i v i s t eff o r t s at m o r a l e d u c a t i o n can successfully resist the p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e g i m e in the l o n g run. In the case of moral e d u c a t i o n , this lack of resist a n c e is s t u n n i n g , given the lack of evidence supporting the basic p r e m i s e of this r e g i m e that p e r s o n a l psychological w e l l - b e i n g is the found a t i o n of moral c o n d u c t , a n d g i v e n the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of specific prog r a m s i n d r u g a n d sex e d u c a t i o n . "There is little o r n o a s s o c i a t i o n , c a u s a l or o t h e r w i s e , " H u n t e r s u m m a rizes, " b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g i c a l wellb e i n g a n d m o r a l conduct, a n d p s y chologically oriented moral e d u c a t i o n p r o g r a m s h a v e little o r n o p o s i t i v e effect u p o n m o r a l behavior, a c h i e v e m e n t , or a n y t h i n g else." Evangelical Protestants are singled out in p a r t i c u l a r b e c a u s e of t h e i r failed a t t e m p t s to co-opt s e c u l a r psychology for religious p u r p o s e s . After rev i e w i n g p r o m i n e n t w o r k s of evangelical g u i d a n c e b y James D o b s o n , K e n n e t h Erickson, Charles G e r b e r , a n d Nell Mohney, H u n t e r c o n c l u d e s t h a t it is p o p u l a r p s y c h o l o g y t h a t frames the d i s c u s s i o n of Biblical morality, n o t the o t h e r way a r o u n d , d e s p i t e the h a r s h criticism of secular p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e of character education by conservative P r o t e s t a n t s . Likewise, n e o c l a s s i c a l and communitarian defenses of moral e d u c a t i o n , exemplified respectively in the efforts of William B e n n e t t a n d Amitai Etzioni, have inREVIEW ESSAY

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s p i r e d p r o g r a m s o f c h a r a c t e r education that have not so m u c h as chall e n g e d the d o m i n a n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h as r e p a c k a g e d t h e lang u a g e o f s e l f - e s t e e m and p e r s o n a l well-being into a m o r e traditional format. After reviewing studies of such programs, H u n t e r c o n c l u d e s that "the newly revived character education programs favored by neoclassical and communitarian educators a p p e a r no m o r e likely to have an e n d u r i n g effect on children than those in the psychological strategy." Hunter does find an e x c e p t i o n to this pattern of accommodation among children raised w i t h i n "theistic" and "conventionalist" moral cultures: they are m o r e likely to s h o w altruism and serf-restraint against temptation. But as they g r o w older t h e y " l e t go" o f their moral cultures, b e c o m i n g "less altruistic in their disposition tow a r d those in n e e d and m o r e willing to fudge the boundaries of moral propriety," s u c c u m b i n g to the therapeutic ethos. "Character," as Rieff o n c e w r o t e , " w a s o n c e u n d e r s t o o d as g r a v e n , deeply etched, c h a n g e a b l e rarely and least of all in e x t r e m e situations,when the resistances against quick change w e r e mobilized most compellingly." Today, A m e r i c a n s have l e a r n e d the remissive lesson that, as Wolfe puts it, "rules are not made to be b r o k e n ... but they are m a d e to be bent:' T h e y have learned that no role should be performed without thought of c h a n g e .With the t r i u m p h of t h e r a p y over character, a veritable m o r a l revol u t i o n has o c c u r r e d that is m o r e farreaching and subtle than Himmelfarb anticipates. Works s u c h as One Nation, Two Cultures may h e l p us to l e a v e w h a t H i m m e l f a r b calls " t h e s t a t e o f denial," but o n l y after t h e reader has u n p a c k e d the denials of the text itself.

A HISTORY OF TERRORISM Walter Laqueur With a new introduction by the author 0-7658-0799-8 (paper) 2001 285 pp. $24.95ls

ANTI-AMERICANISM IRRATIONALAND RATIONAL

Paul Hollander 1-56000-774-5 (paper) 1995 585 pp. $29.95/s

BEHEMOTH MAIN CURRENTSIN THE HISTORYAND THEORYOF POLITICALSOCIOLOGY

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Toll free (US only) 1-888-999-6778 or fax 732-748-9801 A l a n Woolfolk is professor o f sociology a n d director o f the Core Curr i c u l u m a t Oglethorpe University in A t l a n t a . His m o s t recent w o r k f o cuses o n p o s t m o d e r n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d on the concept o f character a n d its relation to the idea o f the therapeutic.

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